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Main points
•	 When	compared	to	other	CIS	countries,	Kazakhstan	is	a	par-
adigm	 of	 success	 in	 terms	 of	 citizens’	 living	 standards,	 the	
country’s	prestige	on	the	international	arena,	or	of	how	to	ef-
fectively	deal	with	domestic	tension.	It	has	a	reputation	of	be-
ing	the	best	developed	and	the	most	stable	country	in	Central	
Asia,	but	 its	 stability	 is	 fragile	 since	 it	 relies	on	one	person,	
President	Nursultan	Nazarbayev.	 It	has	become	increasingly	
apparent	over	the	past	few	years	that	the	existing,	relatively	
successful	model	of	the	state’s	development	which	has	been	in	
place	for	the	more	than	two	decades	since	independence,	has	
been	wearing	ever	more	thin.	
•	 At	 present,	 Kazakhstan	 is	 heading	 towards	 a	 multifaceted	
crisis:	social,	economic	and	political.	The	crisis	has	been	ad-
ditionally	accelerated	by	external	factors	independent	of	the	
government.	 These	 include	 the	 slump	 on	 the	 oil	 market	 –	
crude	oil	being	the	main	source	of	the	country’s	revenue	–	and	
Russia’s	aggressive	policy,	which	has	been	made	manifest	 in	
Ukraine	and	which,	in	the	case	of	Kazakhstan,	includes	tak-
ing	the	form	of	increasing	pressure	for	integration	in	the	Eur-
asian	Economic	Union.	The	government	can	see	the	symptoms	
of	a	crisis	drawing	nearer	(including	growing	public	dissatis-
faction).	One	proof	of	this	is	the	fact	that	it	has	made	a	number	
of	non-standard	moves.	
•	 Unless	the	crisis	avoided	or	at	least	the	descent	into	it	is	slowed	
down,	 the	 present	 system	 of	 state	 operation	 will	 be	 under-
mined.	In	the	extreme	version,	the	crisis	may	lead	to	Kazakh-
stan	losing	everything	it	has	achieved	so	far	and	to	a	collapse	
of	the	state.	There	are	many	negative	scenarios:	from	internal	
destabilisation	 triggered	 by	 socio-economic	 factors,	 through	
infighting	 among	 the	 elite	 for	 Nazarbayev’s	 legacy	 (he	 is	 75	
years	old)	to	disintegration	of	the	state	due	to	ethnic	or	clan-re-
gional	divides.	Thus,	in	the	shorter	term,	Kazakhstan’s	internal	
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stability	is	at	stake,	while	in	strategic	terms,	the	game	is	about	
survival	of	the	state	after	Nazarbayev	relinquishes	power.	
•	 The	main	weaknesses	of	the	state	include:	insufficient	consoli-
dation	of	society	and	the	ruling	elite,	inefficiency	of	the	state	
apparatus	and	the	dilapidated	political	system	which	relies	on	
Nazarbayev.	To	 counteract	 this,	 a	 reconstruction	of	 the	 sys-
tem,	 a	 kind	 of	 perestroika	 initiated	 by	 Nazarbayev	 himself,	
has	 been	 launched.	 This	 includes:	 the	 professionalisation	 of	
public	servants	and,	in	a	broader	sense,	of	state	institutions,	
greater	openness	of	the	economy	and	a	reduction	of	the	state’s	
role	in	the	economy,	as	well	as	actions	to	consolidate	the	public	
around	the	state	(and	national)	idea.	These	changes	are	aimed	
at	strengthening	the	state	by	modernising	it,	which	will	boil	
down	to	a	selective	copying	of	the	Western	solutions	without	
basically	affecting	the	authoritarian	character	of	the	regime	
(however,	some	adjustments	will	be	admissible).	
•	 The	 socio-political	 order	which	Nazarbayev	 has	 himself	 co-
created	in	Kazakhstan	will	impede	the	implementation	of	his	
intentions.	Reforms	will	be	hampered	by	both	the	bureaucrat-
ic	apparatus	and	the	public	sector,	which	are	 inherently	op-
posed	to	any	changes.	There	will	also	be	resistance	from	other	
formal	and	informal	players,	i.e.	political	and	business	groups	
who	oppose	any	increase	 in	competition	within	the	authori-
tarian	system	at	their	expense.	The	process	will	also	be	slowed	
down	due	to	the	passiveness	and	atomisation	of	society,	grow-
ing	 frustration	 among	 the	 public,	 distrust	 towards	 the	 gov-
ernment	as	well	 as	 the	post-colonial	mentality	of	 individual	
social	groups.	The	changes	will	also	be	adversely	affected	by	
the	deteriorating	international	situation	around	Kazakhstan:	
conflict	between	Russia	and	the	West,	Moscow’s	pressure	on	
Astana,	and	economic	problems	in	China.	What	will	contrib-
ute	to	the	changes,	may,	paradoxically,	be	economic	problems	
in	Kazakhstan	 itself	 and	 a	desire	 shared	by	 a	 section	of	 the	
elite	to	modernise	the	system.	
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•	 Implementing	the	reforms	carries	as	much	risk	as	abandon-
ing	 them.	 If	 the	reforms	are	carried	out,	 this	will	break	 the	
arrangements	 existing	 inside	 the	 government	 elite	 and	will	
affect	 the	mutual	relations	between	the	government	and	so-
ciety.	This	may	provoke	 internal	chaos,	but	respect	 for	Naz-
arbayev	and	his	presence	in	the	political	system	may	restrain	
the	fallout	to	a	certain	extent.	The	reforms	will	thus	increase	
the	 risk	 of	 destabilisation	 in	Kazakhstan	 in	 the	 short	 term.	
On	 the	 other	hand,	 if	 they	 are	 implemented,	 they	will	 offer	
the	public	better	access	to	the	functioning	of	the	state	in	the	
broader	sense	and	will	 improve	the	state’s	ability	to	cushion	
the	internal	shocks	(because	most	of	the	public	are	 interest-
ed	 in	 the	system’s	survival)	generated	by	 the	reforms	 them-
selves.	 Therefore,	 the	 perestroika initiated	 by	 Nazarbayev	 is	
a	 risky	 way	 to	 actually	 benefit	 from	 the	 circle	 of	 ever-new	
challenges	which	the	authoritarian	system	is	unable	to	cope	
with.	Reforms	are	Kazakhstan’s	way	of	protecting	itself	from	
plunging	into	the	zone	of	Moscow’s	civilisational,	political	and	
economic	influence,	from	economic	stagnation	and	the	feudal	
socio-political	order	seen	in	Azerbaijan.	
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i. analysis of the challenges  
– the processes taking place in and 
around kazakhstan
Kazakhstan	has	attained	successes,	both	economic	and	on	the	in-
ternational	arena,	but	it	is	still	a	state	where	the	process	of	trans-
formation	and	the	formation	and	solidification	of	state	structures	
has	 not	 been	 finalised.	 Intensive	 internal	 transformation	 can	
sometimes	be	inspired	by	the	government,	but	it	 is	also	an	effect	
of	objective	processes	taking	place	in	society.	The	social	transfor-
mation	which	gained	momentum	when	the	Soviet	Union	collapsed	
was	taking	place	both	under	the	pressure	of	the	economically	tough	
1990s	and	as	a	consequence	of	the	series	of	economic	and	political	
successes	seen	over	the	previous	fifteen	years.	The	way	residents	of	
Kazakhstan	perceive	 their	state	and	themselves	has	been	chang-
ing.	Their	attitude	to	their	history	and	tradition,	which	are	gaining	
significance	in	the	process	of	strengthening	of	the	state	and	the	for-
mation	of	a	modern	nation,	has	also	been	evolving.	The	process	of	
statehood	consolidation	is	taking	place	in	a	difficult	international	
situation,	overshadowed	by	Russia	and	China,	which	see	Kazakh-
stan	as	a	natural	area	for	political	and	economic	expansion.	
The	 challenges	 Kazakhstan	 is	 facing	 are	 nothing	 new,	 but	 the	
need	to	resolve	them	is	becoming	urgent	due	to	unfavourable	ex-
ternal	factors	and	the	growing	risk	of	destabilisation	linked	to	the	
economic	downturn	 in	 the	country.	Weak	points	 in	 the	present	
model	of	the	state’s	operation,	defects	in	the	policy	which	shapes	
society	 and	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 economic	 transformation	 are	
becoming	obvious.	Challenges	linked	to	the	country’s	geopolitical	
situation	are	gaining	significance.	
1. Nazarbayev – the strength and the weakness of the 
political system
Kazakhstan,	 throughout	 the	 25	 years	 of	 its	 independence,	 has	
built	and	reinforced	the	authoritarian	regime	but	has	been	unable	
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to	get	rid	of	the	Soviet	Union’s	institutional	and	mental	legacy.	The	
development	 of	 authoritarianism	was	 both	 an	 effect	 of	 the	 po-
litical	ambitions	of	President	Nursultan	Nazarbayev,	who	is	now	
75	years	old,	and	a	result	of	fears	concerning	the	integrity	of	the	
young	statehood	in	the	first	years	of	independence.	
In	effect,	it	is	Nazarbayev	himself	who	plays	the	key	role	in	both	
the	 formal	 (constitutional)	 and	 informal	 system	 of	 exercising	
power	in	Kazakhstan.	It	is	he	who	personally	takes	the	key	deci-
sions	concerning	the	country’s	political,	economic	and	social	life.	
He	is	the	figure	on	whom	political	and	business	groups	are	cen-
tred	(these	can	be	regional	or	clan	groups	or	simply	groups	united	
by	a	tactical	community	of	business	and	political	interests).	These	
groups	are	not	autonomous	–	either	politically	or	economically	–	
and	are	completely	dependent	on	the	president1.	Nazarbayev	acts	
as	an	arbiter	between	them,	preventing	major	conflicts	and	keep-
ing	their	influence	balanced.	Furthermore,	there	is	no	real	politi-
cal	opposition	in	the	country2,	and	the	public	is	passive	and	most-
1	 All	major	businessmen	either	have	close	links	with	the	government	(Naz-
arbayev	himself)	or	are	politicians	themselves.	For	example,	the	people	who	
occupied	the	top	positions	in	Forbes’	ranking	in	Kazakhstan	in	2015	were:	
Bolat	Utemuratov	(presidential	advisor,	special	envoy	to	Kyrgyzstan	during	
the	coup	in	2010),	Alijan	Ibragimov	(the	founder	of	ENRC,	a	company	whose	
assets	he	bought	as	a	result	of	the	privatisation	in	the	1990s),	Timur	and	Di-
nara	Kulibayev	(Nazarbayev’s	son-in-law	and	daughter;	Timur	Kulibayev	
is	also	the	head	of	Atameken,	the	National	Chamber	of	Entrepreneurs,	and	
of	the	association	Kazenergy	–	both	of	these	organisations	are	active	eco-
nomic	players	and	have	influence	on	political	decisions)	and	Vladimir	Kim	
(co-owner	of	Kazakhmys,	a	company	in	which	Nazarbayev	also	reportedly	
has	a	stake).	Other	groups	are	linked	to,	for	example,	Prime	Minister	Karim	
Masimov	or	the	Defence	Minister	Imangali	Tasmagambetov	(his	son-in-law,	
Kenes	Rakishev	owns	several	banks	and	companies	in	the	energy	sector).
2	 Mukhtar	Ablyazov,	a	banker	and	oligarch,	who	wants	to	be	viewed	as	Naz-
arbayev’s	political	opponent,	has	himself	been	part	of	the	system	for	years.	
He	spent	a	few	months	in	prison	after	his	first	political	move	targeted	against	
Nazarbayev,	only	to	return	to	the	peak	of	his	career	in	the	country	–	he	was	
the	head	and	the	owner	of	the	largest	bank.	His	activity	(supporting	inde-
pendent	media)	has	been	tolerated	for	years	as	a	safety	valve	and	a	source	of	
knowledge	about	social	processes.	However,	in	practice,	public	support	for	
Ablyazov	is	negligible,	which	is	partly	due	to	the	conviction	that	he	himself	
is	part	of	the	establishment,	even	if	he	is	at	odds	with	it.	
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ly	interested	in	maintaining	the	status quo	rather	than	developing	
political	competition.	
Such	a	strong	centralisation	of	state	governance	on	the	one	hand	
simplifies	the	decision-making	process	but	on	the	other	reduces	
the	quantity	of	grassroots	stimuli	to	protect	the	system	from	pos-
sible	upheaval	 (the	 symptoms	of	 a	 crisis	 appearing	 on	 the	 local	
level	 are	 unobservable	 from	Astana’s	 perspective).	 In	 turn,	 the	
unresolved	issue	of	Nazarbayev’s	successor3	is	causing	individual	
players	on	the	political	scene	to	be	afraid	to	display	any	political	
activity	so	as	not	to	be	suspected	of	the	desire	to	take	power	after	
him4.	Nazarbayev’s	presence	allows	the	groups	surrounding	him	
to	refrain	from	responding	to	any	strategic	challenges	because	it	
is	he	who	sets	the	tone,	and	the	role	of	the	rest	of	the	government	
elite	is	to	implement	the	strategies	put	forward	by	the	president.	
In	practice,	 the	system	functions	 this	way:	Nazarbayev	sets	 the	
priorities	 in	 his	 annual	 address	 to	 the	 nation	 or	 in	 the	 reform	
plan,	and	these	must	then	be	implemented	(and	to	a	certain	ex-
tent	 are)	 by	 all	 state	 institutions5.	 This	 deal	 limits	 the	 system’s	
effectiveness,	because	it	does	not	envisage	any	discussion	on	the	
plan	being	implemented	–	the	system	does	not	allow	any	criticism	
of	actions	or	directions	set	by	the	president6,	but	it	is	admissible	
to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	 the	operation	of	 individual	state	
3	 The	strongest	political	upheaval	in	Kazakhstan	was	caused	by	the	ambitions	
of	Rakhat	Aliyev,	Nazarbayev’s	son-in-law,	to	replace	him	as	president.	When	
Aliyev	revealed	his	political	ambitions,	he	was	forced	to	emigrate	and	divorce	
Nazarbayev’s	daughter in absentia.	The	government	also	made	charges	in-
cluding	treason	against	him	(2007).	
4	 For	example,	Karim	Masimov	became	very	popular	during	his	first	term	in	
office	as	prime	minister.	As	a	result,	when	he	took	this	function	another	time,	
he	shunned	all	publicity	and	appearances	in	the	media	so	as	to	avoid	being	
viewed	as	a	potential	successor	to	Nazarbayev.	
5	 The	information	that	the	presidential	address	was	analysed	in	kindergarten	
no.	48	became	a	symbol	demonstrating	the	absurdity	of	the	system	and	the	
public	sector’s	servility,	http://rus.azattyq.org/content/promotion-poslani-
yu-prezidenta-nursultana-nazarbaeva/25249118.html
6	 Grigori	Marchenko,	who	came	into	conflict	with	Nazarbayev	over	the	pen-
sion	system	reform,	finally	resigned	as	head	of	the	central	bank.	
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institutions	(for	example,	one	may	criticise	actions	taken	by	the	
central	bank	or	the	government).	
This	means	 that	 the	 state	governance	system	 is	 in	 fact	 reminis-
cent	 of	 a	 pyramid	 based	 on	 the	 patron-client	 deal.	 Nazarbayev	
stands	at	the	top	of	this	pyramid	as	an	element	necessary	for	its	
survival.	The	system,	by	nature,	promotes	such	features	as	loyalty	
and	obedience	to	the	president	and	other	political	patrons	rather	
than	actions	that	are	believed	to	serve	the	interests	of	the	state	or	
even	the	governing	pro-presidential	party	Nur	Otan	(for	example,	
independent	 thinking	 is	 a	 strongly	 undesirable	 feature).	 In	 this	
system,	the	parliament	and	local	government	bodies	play	a	merely	
decorative	role,	because	the	president	alone	appoints	the	people	in	
charge	of	executive	authority	bodies,	such	as	ministers,	the	head	of	
the	central	banks	and	also	akims7	of	the	regions,	and	has	the	right	
to	dismiss	 them	summarily.	Such	a	strong	centralisation	results	
from	the	fear	that	this	young	state	could	become	disintegrated,	but	
its	negative	 consequences	 include	 the	 exemption	of	 government	
representatives	from	accountability	to	the	public	(they	only	report	
to	Nazarbayev).	As	a	result,	the	effectiveness	of	state	institutions	
is	 limited.	 At	 the	 level	 of	 local	 administration,	 this	 tendency	 is	
manifested	in	the	manner	in	which	the	akims govern	the	regions:	
they	are	more	focused	on	implementing	the	presidential	strategy	
in	a	simulated	and	ineffective	way	rather	than	on	the	actual	de-
velopment	of	the	regions8.	They	also	benefit	financially	from	their	
functions	through	creating	or	maintaining	deals	based	on	corrup-
tion.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 clientelistic	model	 applicable	 among	
the	senior	government	authorities	is	copied	in	the	regions,	where	
7	 The	word	akim	means	‘boss,	head’.	Akims are	heads	of	the	local	state	admin-
istration	on	every	level,	from	the	region	to	the	village.
8	 In	practice,	this	works	in	the	following	way:	akims of	the	regions	implement	
infrastructural	projects	because	these	are	the	most	visible	and	allow	them	to	
benefit	from	the	‘civil	servant	pension’,	i.e.	income	from	corruption,	without	
taking	care	of	the	structural	or	social	issues	in	the	region.	This	is	also	an	
effect	partly	of	the	ignorance	and	lack	of	knowledge	of	the	tools	that	might	
contribute	to	the	sustainable	development	of	a	given	area	and	resolving	its	
social	issues.	
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the	akims play	the	role	of	political	patrons.	This	model	as	well	as	
the	omnipresent	corruption	and	nepotism9,	restricts	the	effective-
ness	of	the	state	administration’s	operation	and	poses	the	risk	that	
any	reforms	of	the	currently	functioning	system	will	fail.	
One	 consequence	 of	Nazarbayev’s	 dominant	 role	 in	 the	 state	 as	
regards	the	social	dimension	is	the	fact	that	he	himself	plays	the	
role	of	the	one	who	binds	the	public	together.	Most	citizens	genu-
inely	appreciate	the	president’s	merits	and	support	Nazarbayev	as	
the	head	of	state10,	partly	due	to	the	lack	of	any	other	alternative	
–	Nazarbayev	has	successfully	rid	himself	of	political	opponents.	
It	is	he	personally,	and	not	state	institutions,	who	is	viewed	as	the	
guarantor	of	internal	stability	and	also	of	peace	between	the	vari-
ous	ethnic	groups	in	the	country;	hence	the	higher	support	levels	
for	Nazarbayev	 among	 non-Kazakh	 ethnic	 groups11.	 The	 fear	 of	
Nazarbayev	leaving	is	currently	the	main	element	that	unites	the	
public	and	the	political	elite.	At	the	same	time,	Kazakhstan	has	no	
coherent	ideology	that	would	be	consistently	put	into	practice	and	
which	would	unite	 the	public	with	 the	political	 system	and	 the	
elite	 (as	 is	 the	 case	with	Turkmenistan).	This	means	 that	when	
Nazarbayev	 (the	 binding	 link)	 relinquishes	 power,	 elements	 of	
the	political	and	social	system,	and	to	some	extent	also	the	insti-
tutional	order,	will	collapse.	This	is	linked	to	the	enormous	role	
played	by	the	informal	dependencies	and	Nazarbayev’s	esteem	in	
the	functioning	of	institutions.	Possible	scenarios	include	ethnic	
riots	or	 the refusal	of	akims to	subordinate	themselves	to	a	new	
president,	whose	 achievements	 and	 authority	will	 be	 unable	 to	
match	those	of	Nazarbayev.	
9	 http://www.ktk.kz/ru/news/video/2013/05/29/22850,	 http://www.nur.
kz/966822-syn-akima-akmolinskoy-oblasti-naznach.html	
10	 Indirect	proof	of	this	is	found,	for	example,	in	the	74%	support	for	granting	
Nazarbayev	the	title	of	the	nation’s	leader	(20%	of	respondents	were	neutrally	
disposed	to	this),	which	the	respondents	saw	as	“a	step	contributing	to	in-
ternal	political	stabilisation	and	the	development	of	social	consolidation”,	cf.	
http://www.nomad.su/?a=3-201008170032
11	 An	interview	with	a	representative	of	a	sociological	agency	in	Astana.
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In	this	situation,	Nazarbayev	is	both	the	most	precious	asset	and	
the	heaviest	burden	for	Kazakhstan.	On	the	one	hand,	his	position	
is	strong	enough	to	cause	the	present	model	of	the	state’s	operation	
to	be	adjusted.	On	the	other,	the	present	system	will	most	likely	be	
unable	to	survive	without	Nazarbayev.	For	example,	the	Russian	
president	Vladimir	Putin	used	this	argument	to	put	pressure	on	
Kazakhstan	at	the	time	of	the	youth	forum	by	Lake	Seliger	in	Au-
gust	2014	by	saying	that	it	is	Nazarbayev	who	set	up	the	state	of	
Kazakhstan12.	The	government	in	Astana	understood	these	words	
as	a	threat	to	the	state’s	functioning	in	its	present	form	and	with	
its	present	degree	of	independence	from	Russia	when	Nazarbayev	
is	no	longer	in	power.	
2. society – the numerous divides
Kazakhstan’s	social	 situation	has	been	undergoing	a	 transforma-
tion	(in	most	cases	unfinished)	typical	of	the	former	Soviet	repub-
lics.	The	process	of	social	formation	has	been	affected	by	objective	
demographic	processes,	geographic	(distances)	and	historic	condi-
tions	(for	example,	Soviet	legacy	borders),	as	well	as	migration	pro-
cesses.	The	social	experience	of	 the	economic	slump	in	 the	 1990s	
and	the	rapid	economic	development	that	followed	this	period	also	
have	a	great	significance.	Other	factors	affecting	the	social	process-
es	include:	Kazakhstan’s	changing	international	context	(for	exam-
ple,	the	Russian	aggression	on	Ukraine),	the	fact	that	Kazakhstan	is	
within	the	area	of	influence	of	the	Russian	media,	and	the	continu-
ing	widespread	knowledge	and	use	of	the	Russian	language13.	
12	 http://www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan-putin-history-reaction-na-
tion/26565141.html
13	 Knowledge	of	Russian	in	Kazakhstan	is	the	highest	of	all	the	Central	Asian	
countries.	84%	of	its	residents	declare	they	speak	Russian.	To	compare:	49%	
in	Kyrgyzstan,	41%	in	Uzbekistan,	33%	in	Tajikistan	and	18%	in	Turkmeni-
stan.	The	proportion	of	people	who	actively	know	the	language,	i.e.	who	can	
not	only	speak	it,	but	also	write	and	read	in	this	language,	is	smaller:	72%	
in	Kazakhstan,	36%	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	14%	in	Uzbekistan.	Data	taken	from:	
http://www.ritmeurasia.org/news--2015-11-21--na-juge-sng-russkij-mir-
stanovitsja-aziatskim-20653
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The	most	important	division	lines	and	processes	taking	place	in	
society	are	present	on	the	ethnic,	 linguistic	and	regional	 levels,	
between	urban	and	rural	residents,	as	well	as	on	the	level	of	at-
titude	towards	the	USSR.	What	helps	them	persist	are	the	 large	
geographical	distances	and	the	lack	of	well-developed	infrastruc-
tural	connections.	These	divides	are	an	effect	of	both	the	Soviet	
legacy,	such	as	certain	boundaries	and	ethnic	compositions,	and	
the	 changes	which	 have	 taken	 place	 in	Kazakhstan	 since	 it	 re-
gained	independence.	
Changes	in	the	country’s	ethnic	composition	are	among	the	most	
important	processes	 that	have	had	an	 impact	on	 the	 condition	
of	society.	Over	 the	past	 twenty	five	years,	 the	share	of	ethnic	
Kazakhs	in	the	country’s	population	has	increased	from	40%14	in	
1989	to	63.1%	in	2009,	and	in	absolute	numbers:	from	6.5	million	
to	10	million.	This	increase	has	been	an	effect	of:	the	state	policy	
aimed	 at	 repatriating	 ethnic	 Kazakhs	 from	 the	 neighbouring	
countries,	so-called	oralman15,	the	higher	birth	rate	among	ethnic	
Kazakh	families,	and	non-Kazakhs	 leaving	 the	country.	At	 the	
same	time,	the	share	of	ethnic	Russians	has	been	reduced	from	
37.6%	in	1989	to	23.7%	in	2009	(from	6	million	to	less	than	4	mil-
lion	people),	as	with	other	ethnic	groups	(mainly	Germans:	from	
around	1	million	to	0.2	million	and	Ukrainians:	from	0.9	million	
to	0.3	million)	who	had	been	exiled	and	migrated	to	Kazakhstan	
during	the	Soviet	era.	Their	departure	was	triggered	above	all	
by	 the	 economic	 hardships	 in	 the	 1990s	 (64%	 of	 those	 leaving	
declared	that	unemployment	was	the	reason	they	were	leaving	
14	 Unless	otherwise	stated,	all	data	in	this	chapter	is	taken	from	the	population	
census	carried	out	in	2009.	The	results	are	available	here:	http://www.stat.
gov.kz/faces/wcnav_externalId/p_perepis?_afrLoop=27247942884727437#%
40%3F_afrLoop%3D27247942884727437%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D29gmhq4tr_87
15	 As	a	consequence	of	this	policy,	around	1	million	people	went	to	Kazakh-
stan,	mainly	from	Uzbekistan	(30.7%),	China	(20.3%),	Turkmenistan	(14.9%)	
and	Mongolia	(12.1%).	Data	from:	Gaziz	Telebayev,	Problemy	sotsialnoi	in-
tegratsii	oralmanov,	v	kontekste	yazykovoi	situatsii	v	Kazakhstane,	from	
the	collection	of	texts	titled	Sotsialnyi portret sovremennogo kazakhstanskogo 
obshchestva,	Astana-Almaty	2015.
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of	Kazakhstan16)	and	an	inability	to	adapt	themselves	to	the	Ka-
zakhisation	policy17,	i.e.	promoting	ethnic	Kazakhs	and	the	Ka-
zakh	language	in	all	areas	of	the	country’s	life.	For	example,	16%	
of	those	leaving	indicated	the	language	policy	as	the	main	reason	
why	they	moved	away	from	Kazakhstan	in	199818.	The	repatria-
tion	 policies	 of	 the	 states	which	 the	 emigrants	 had	 originated	
from,	 for	 example,	 Germany,	was	 a	 further	 factor	which	 trig-
gered	emigration.	The	Russian	minority	was	 the	 largest	group	
among	those	who	left	Kazakhstan	(although	the	share	of	ethnic	
Germans	reduced	most	of	all:	from	5.8%	in	1989	to	1.1%	in	2009).	
Ethnic	Russians	also	migrated	within	Kazakhstan,	moving	from	
its	southern	regions,	where	they	formed	a	minority,	to	the	north-
ern	part,	where	they	were	predominant.	The	predominance	of	
ethnic	Russians	in	the	country’s	northern	regions	(especially	in	
the	 cities)	 has	made	 the	Kazakh	 government	 concerned	 about	
the	risk	of	separatism	since	the	beginning	of	the	country’s	inde-
pendence19.	
16	 http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Mes/pdf/51_06.pdf
17	 The	manifestations	of	this	policy	include	removing	representatives	of	ethnic	
minorities	from	the	state	administration.	For	example,	at	the	beginning	of	
2016,	all	akims of	the	regions	in	Kazakhstan	were	ethnic	Kazakhs,	and	only	
two	representatives	of	ethnic	minorities	were	present	in	the	government:	
the	minister	for	oil	and	gas,	Vladimir	Shkolnik	(Russian)	and	Prime	Minis-
ter	Karim	Masimov	(Uyghur).	Another	example	of	this	policy	was	the	use	of	
the	Kazakh	language	by	the	akims of	the	northern	regions	–	the	residents,	
predominantly	ethnic	Russians,	could	not	understand	this	language.	This	
practice	has	changed	since	the	developments	in	Ukraine	and	after	an	in-
tervention	by	Nazarbayev.	Other	manifestations	of	Kazakhisation	include	
replacing	the	names	of	the	cities,	streets,	etc.	with	Kazakh	ones	(for	example,	
Ust	Kamenogorsk	has	been	renamed	Oskemen)	and	propagating	Kazakh	po-
ets,	traditions,	etc.	Generally,	Kazakhisation	can	be	defined	as	giving	special	
attention	to	what	is	Kazakh	and	promoting	the	influence	of	ethnic	Kazakhs	
in	all	areas	of	the	state’s	life.	Kazakhisation	is	viewed	as	compensation	for	
the	discrimination	in	the	Soviet	era	and	is	often	done	at	the	expense	of	other	
ethnic	groups	living	in	Kazakhstan.	
18	 http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Mes/pdf/51_06.pdf
19	 In	1999,	more	than	twenty	people	were	arrested	in	Ust	Kamenogorsk	on	charg-
es	of	staging	a	coup	and	devising	a	plan	to	incite	a	Russian	uprising,	cf.	http://
rus.azattyq.org/content/kazakhstan_kazimirchuk_cossack/1910599.html
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Ethnic	differences	are	a	 reflection	of	 the	various	perceptions	of	
the	independent	Kazakhstan.	Ethnic	Kazakhs	viewed	the	setting	
up	of	Kazakhstan	as	an	opportunity	to	launch	the	Kazakhisation	
policy	at	the	expense	of	other	ethnic	minorities	and	a	kind	of	com-
pensation	for	discrimination	in	the	Soviet	era.	Kazakhs	often	see	
their	 role	 in	 the	 country	as	 that	 of	 ‘first	 amongst	 equals’,	while	
ethnic	 Russians	 (and	 other	 Slavonic	 minorities)	 feel	 marginal-
ised20	 and	mention	 that	 it	 is	 their	 ancestors	 who	 defended	 the	
USSR	and	Kazakhstan	(during	World	War	II,	which	is	called	the	
Great	Patriotic	War	in	the	post-Soviet	area)	and	who	built	it.	The	
fear	 of	 intensifying	 nationalism	 in	 Kazakhstan	makes	 that	 the	
ethnic	minorities	usually	ostentatiously	emphasise	their	satisfac-
tion	with	the	situation	in	Kazakhstan	and	support	Nazarbayev	as	
the	guarantor	of	the	status quo,	i.e.	inter-ethnic	peace.	
In	practice,	riots	caused	by	ethnic	conflicts	are	rarely	seen	in	Ka-
zakhstan	(the	most	serious	were	the	local	riots	with	the	involve-
ment	of	Chechens	near	Almaty	in	200721	and	the	conflict	between	
ethnic	Tajiks	and	Kazakhs	in	February	2015	in	southern	Kazakh-
stan)	and	are	usually	provoked	by	issues	 linked	to	 living	condi-
tions.	This	does	not	change	the	fact	that	the	government	is	at	great	
pains	to	suppress	information	of	any	ethnic	misunderstandings	
(for	example,	an	information	blockade	was	introduced	in	the	en-
tire	region	at	the	time	of	the	riots	in	February	2015).	This	is	a	sign	
of	the	fear	that	such	conflicts	might	spread	wider	across	the	coun-
try	and	of	the	conviction	that	a	fertile	ground	exists	for	such	con-
flicts	 (this	 is	 well-grounded,	 because	 Kazakh	 nationalism	 has	
20	 This	marginalisation	takes	various	forms,	for	example,	addressing	ethnic	
Russians	in	the	Kazakh	language	(by	ethnic	Kazakhs	who	speak	Russian),	the	
‘glass	ceiling’	in	professional	careers,	multiplying	bureaucratic	difficulties.	
An	elderly	person	of	German-Polish	ethnic	background	living	near	Petropav-
lovsk	expressed	it	this	way:	“Those	slant-eyed	ones	from	the	south	will	come,	
and	it	will	be	impossible	to	have	any	formalities	handled.”	
21	 Three	people	were	killed	in	the	riots	in	2007	and	one	in	2015.	Kazakhstan,	
unlike	its	neighbour	Kyrgyzstan,	has	never	experienced	any	serious	riots	
on	its	territory	–	for	example,	hundreds	of	people	were	killed	in	the	riots	
between	ethnic	Kyrgyz	and	Uzbeks	in	Osh,	Kyrgyzstan	in	2010.	
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been	 intensifying,	 and	 there	 are	 informal	 Kazakh	 and	Russian	
neighbourhoods	 in	 some	cities).	As	a	 consequence,	ethnic	prob-
lems	are	covered	up	using	the	Soviet-style	narrative	of	accord,	co-
operation,	peace,	etc.	existing	between	the	various	ethnic	groups;	
the	symbol	of	the	policy	being	the	decorative	institution,	the	As-
sembly	of	the	People	of	Kazakhstan22.	In	the	authoritarian	system,	
given	 the	 strongly	 centralised	 power	 held	 by	 Nazarbayev,	 this	
tactic	has	proven	relatively	successful	–	Kazakhstan	has	been	able	
to	avoid	serious	ethnic	unrest,	unlike	its	neighbour,	Kyrgyzstan.	
However,	the	downside	of	this	policy	is	the	fact	that	ethnic	minor-
ities	fear	that	when	Nazarbayev	is	no	longer	in	power,	the	existing	
guarantee	of	peace	may	disappear	and	trigger	ethnic	conflicts	and	
pressure	from	Kazakh	nationalism23.	
One	consequence,	and	later	also	the	cause	for	changes	in	the	coun-
try’s	ethnic	composition	(migration)	was	the	increasing	share	of	
the	 Kazakh-speaking	 population24	 –	 in	 2009,	 74%	 of	 population	
declared	they	understood	Kazakh,	and	62%	were	fluent	users	of	
this	 language.	The	 ever	more	widespread	knowledge	 of	 the	Ka-
zakh	language	has	been	furthered	by	the	government	on	various	
levels	–	from	making	relevant	changes	to	the	education	policy	(for	
example,	in	2011,	two	thirds	of	pupils	attended	schools	with	Ka-
zakh	as	the	language	of	instruction)25	through	free-of-charge	Ka-
zakh	language	courses	for	adults	and	the	requirement	to	broad-
cast	 TV	 programmes	 in	 this	 language	 (over	 53%	 of	 TV	 content	
must	be	in	Kazakh)	up	to	symbolic	elements,	for	example,	using	
22	 Ethnic	minorities	 in	Kazakhstan	have	no	guaranteed	representatives	 in	
other	institutions	except	the	Assembly.	In	turn,	the	Assembly	elects	nine	
members	of	the	lower	house	of	parliament.	
23	 For	 example,	 https://meduza.io/news/2014/10/20/ust-kamenogorskaya-
narodnaya-respublika
24	 The	 government	 has	 taken	 numerous	measures	 to	 improve	 the	 level	 of	
knowledge	of	the	Kazakh	language,	cf.	http://inform.kz/rus/article/2842902
25	 The	OECD	report	on	the	education	system	in	Kazakhstan:	http://www.kee-
peek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/education/reviews-of-national-
policies-for-education-secondary-education-in-kazakhstan/overview-of-
the-education-system-of-kazakhstan_9789264205208-4-en#page5
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
6/
20
16
18
Kazakh	during	prestigious	international	conferences26	and	insist-
ing	that	foreign	delegations	should	have	interpreters	who	speak	
this	language27.	There	is	a	growing	conviction	in	Kazakhstan	that	
the	Kazakh	language	plays	the	role	of	social	leverage28.	Someone	
who	is	not	an	ethnic	Kazakh	must	learn	the	national	language	to	
expect	 social	 advancement	 (an	alternative	way	 is	 to	marry	 into	
a	Kazakh	family	and	use	the	family	bonds	when	looking	for	a	job).	
The	increasingly	widespread	knowledge	of	the	Kazakh	language	
is	not	accompanied	by	a	process	of	a	proportional	reduction	of	the	
role	 played	 by	 the	 Russian	 language,	which	 formally	 (constitu-
tionally)	has	the	status	of	a	language	which	can	be	used	on	equal	
terms	with	the	Kazakh	language	in	the	state	institutions	and	in	
local	administration.	Fluent	command	of	Russian	was	declared	in	
2009	by	85%	of	the	population	(80%	of	ethnic	Kazakhs).	On	the	one	
hand,	this	is	tolerated	by	the	government	–	Russian	is	a	window	
to	the	world	for	a	large	group	of	the	country’s	population.	On	the	
other	hand,	 the	widespread	knowledge	of	Russian	coupled	with	
the	weakness	of	the	Kazakh	media	and	the	omnipresence	of	Rus-
sian	television	means	that	people	in	Kazakhstan	are	under	a	huge	
influence	of	Russian	propaganda	and	support	Russian	foreign	pol-
icy,	for	example,	towards	Ukraine29.	
The	social	dynamics	and	the	existing	divides	make	it	problematic	
to	determine	the	roles	played	by	 individual	social	groups	 in	the	
26	 Nazarbayev	caused	dismay	when	he	used	the	Kazakh	language	for	the	first	
time	at	the	UN	forum	in	September	2015,	because	the	UN	had	no	interpreter	
of	this	language.	
27	 A	film	in	which	one	of	the	regional	akims	reprimands	an	interpreter	of	the	
Chinese	delegation	for	her	not	speaking	Kazakh	was	extremely	popular	on	
the	Kazakh	Internet	in	January	2016	(the	film:	https://www.facebook.com/
syrym.abdrakhmanov/videos/827130164075788/?pnref=story).
28	 Good	command	of	the	Kazakh	language	is	leverage	for	social	advancement	
for	ethnic	Kazakhs	and	also	representatives	of	other	ethnic	groups,	cf.	http://
www.nomad.su/?a=10-201506260028
29	 According	to	the	Gallup	poll,	it	was	supported	by	72%	of	Kazakhstan’s	resi-
dents	in	summer	2015,	http://rus.azattyk.org/content/article/27076844.html
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country	and	give	rise	to	conflicts	over	values	(for	example,	Rus-
sians	and	Kazakhs	have	a	different	view	on	history30).	
Another	divide	is	caused	by	the	differences	and	mutual	animosi-
ties	 existing	 among	 ethnic	 Kazakhs.	 These	 are	 regional	 differ-
ences:	 for	 example,	 the	 north	 versus	 the	 south	 of	 the	 country,	
and	between	the	oil	and	gas-rich	western	part	and	the	rest.	The	
process	of	urbanisation	of	the	Kazakh	population	contributes	to	
such	differences	being	unearthed31.	For	example,	the	capital	of	the	
country	which	has	been	moved	from	the	south	to	the	north	is	an	
arena	 for	mutual	discord	between	Kazakhs	 from	 the	 south	and	
those	 from	 the	north.	This	 is	 even	more	paradoxical,	 given	 the	
fact	that	moving	the	capital	to	Astana	was	intended	to	stimulate	
integration	of	the	northern	and	southern	regions	and	to	prevent	
separatist	tendencies	in	the	north.	In	turn,	the	western	regions	of	
Kazakhstan	believe	that	they	are	the	country’s	cash	cow,	because	
of	the	oil,	and	therefore	deserve	special	treatment.	
In	the	search	of	a	Kazakh	identity,	history	and	tradition,	the	zhuz 
issues	 have	 re-gained	 significance32.	 The	 re-traditionalisation	
process	hinders	the	formation	of	a	modern	nation	and	leads	to	the	
preservation	of	local	communities,	for	example,	in	the	more	tra-
ditional	southern	Kazakhstan,	and	to	the	dominance	of	the	local	
30	 This	is	reflected,	for	example,	by	the	analysis	of	the	contents	of	Kazakh-lan-
guage	websites,	especially	those	that	are	not	controlled	by	the	government,	
cf.	The	Strategy	Center	report,	http://www.nomad.su/i2013/0710.pdf.	The	is-
sues	linked	to	the	Soviet	period	that	are	most	frequently	raised	in	the	Kazakh	
media	concern	the	Alash	Orda	independence	movement	and	the	hunger	and	
repressions	in	the	1920s	and	1930s.	
31	 The	number	of	Kazakhs	living	in	large	urban	areas	increased	from	2.5	mil-
lion	in	1989	to	almost	5	million	in	2009.	Those	living	in	rural	areas	rose	from	
4	million	to	5.2	million	over	the	same	timeframe.	
32	 The	zhuz is	historically	the	highest	form	of	Kazakh	self-organisation	(an	
equivalent	of	orda).	The	zhuz lost	significance	to	a	great	extent	in	the	Soviet	
era.	At	present,	they	have	a	moderate	impact	on	the	political	contract	in	the	
country	because	they	have	been	ousted	by	groups	of	interest.	Traditionally,	
the	three	most	important	zhuz are	distinguished	in	Kazakhstan:	the	older	
(south),	the	medium	(north)	and	the	younger	(west).	Sometimes,	informally,	
ethnic	Russians	living	in	Kazakhstan	are	referred	to	as	the	fourth	zhuz.	
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identity,	and	thus	may	bolster	separatist	tendencies	should	state	
institutions	become	weaker33.
The	 urbanisation	 and	 the	 growing	 strength	 of	 nationalist	 ten-
dencies	also	gives	rise	to	conflicts	between	Russian-speaking	and	
Kazakh-speaking	ethnic	Kazakhs.	One	manifestation	of	these	is	
the	pejorative	word	shala-Kazakh	meaning	an	ethnic	Kazakh	who	
cannot	 speak	 the	 Kazakh	 language	 (unlike	 nagyz-Kazakh	 who	
knows	his	native	 language).	The	conflict	over	 language	issues	 is	
coupled	with	 the	city	versus	village	divide	 (the	 former	are	usu-
ally	Russian	speakers	and	the	latter	are	Kazakh	speakers)	and	the	
process	of	social	atomisation.	Uprooting	 from	the	multi-genera-
tion	family	system	affects	above	all	ethnic	Kazakhs	who	migrate	
to	cities,	bringing	at	the	same	time	the	Kazakh	language	and	the	
more	traditional	models	to	the	urban	areas.	The	divides	also	take	
the	form	of	an	increasing	gap	between	the	younger	and	the	older	
generations	as	well	as	the	conflict	between	the	elites:	the	new	elite	
who	 have	 been	 brought	 up	 in	 an	 independent	Kazakhstan	 ver-
sus	 the	 representatives	of	 the	Soviet	 school.	The	differing	goals	
of	 the	 regional	 elites	 complicates	 the	 situation	 further.	 Add	 to	
this	the	government’s	fear	of	ethnic	conflicts,	Islamic	radicalism,	
disintegration	of	the	state	and	separatism.	However,	in	practice,	
Nazarbayev’s	 regime	 has	 been	 quite	 successful	 at	 dealing	 with	
these	 issues,	 neutralising	 Islamic	 radicalism,	 soothing	 ethnic	
conflicts	and	avoiding	any	serious	manifestations	of	separatism.	
This	has	been	achieved	owing	to	the	strength	of	the	regime	and	
Nazarbayev’s	personal	esteem.	However,	it	is	unclear	whether	the	
state	institutions	will	be	strong	enough	to	cope	with	these	chal-
lenges	 if	Nazarbayev	 is	not	 there,	 since	 the	Zhanaozen	 incident	
(this	issue	is	discussed	below)	laid	bare	the	system’s	indolence	in	
handling	social	issues.	
33	 The	zhuz	issues,	due	to	respondents’	unwillingness	to	answer	questions,	
have	not	been	sufficiently	researched	in	Kazakhstan.	Nevertheless,	experts	
agree	that	their	significance	may	grow	as	the	central	government	weakens	
in	the	state,	cf.	http://www.nomad.su/?a=3-201412020022,	http://www.nur.
kz/242087.html,	http://www.nur.kz/217863.html
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The	project	of	creating	a	common	identity	based	on	the	sense	of	
being	citizens	and	identifying	with	‘Kazakhstan-ness’	has	been	
unsuccessful,	 and	 divides	 among	Kazakhs	 themselves	 and	 be-
tween	the	other	ethnic	groups	are	deepening.	The	way	citizens	
of	Kazakhstan	view	themselves	is	strongly	affected	by	such	fac-
tors	as	the	language,	ethnicity,	and	the	fact	that	one	originates	
from	 a	 given	 region.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 citizens	 are	more	 and	
more	attached	to	the	idea	of	Kazakhstan’s	statehood,	but	it	does	
not	play	the	consolidating	function	at	present	because	its	signifi-
cance	has	been	overshadowed	by	 ever	 stronger	divides	 among	
the	Kazakh	public	(for	example,	an	ethnic	Kazakh	who	is	criti-
cal	of	the	government’s	activity	may	accuse	an	ethnic	Russian	of	
criticising	state	authorities	in	the	Russian	language	and	of	fail-
ing	to	learn	Kazakh	so	far34).	The	process	of	society	and	modern	
political	nation	forming	in	Kazakhstan	is	therefore	still	a	work	
in	progress.	
At	 the	same	time,	Kazakhstan,	 in	 the	opinion	of	a	great	section	
of	the	Kazakh	public,	has	benefited	from	the	collapse	of	the	USSR	
–	45%35	of	respondents	believed	so	in	2013	(by	comparison,	37%	in	
Georgia).	Only	25%	of	the	respondents	were	of	the	opinion	that	the	
collapse	of	the	USSR	was	disadvantageous	to	their	country	(33%	
in	Georgia	and	56%	 in	Ukraine).	Kazakhstan’s	economic	success	
is	the	reason	why	almost	half	of	the	Kazakh	public	generally	have	
a	positive	opinion	about	the	collapse	of	the	USSR.	
3. The economic model that boosts social aspirations
The	economic	model	adopted	by	Nazarbayev	envisages	a	partial	
liberalisation	of	the	economy	and	opening	the	country	up	to	for-
eign	 investments.	 This	 has	 made	 it	 possible	 to	 skilfully	 utilise	
34	 Cf.	Facebook	discussions	between	Mukhtar	Taizhan	and	Sergey	Duvanov.
35	 Data	from:	http://www.gallup.com/poll/166538/former-soviet-countries-harm-
breakup.aspx?g_source=kazakhstan&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles
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the	country’s	rich	deposits	of	mineral	raw	materials36	(unlike	its	
neighbour,	Turkmenistan)	and	 to	achieve	success.	The	measure	
of	this	success	was	the	impressive	economic	growth	an	annual	of	
average	7.2%	between	2004	and	2014	(in	1990-1995,	Kazakhstan’s	
economy	had	contracted	by	36%),	average	income	per capita	grew	
from	US$94	 to	US$346	 (average	monthly	wages	 from	US$208	 to	
US$675)37.	At	the	same	time,	the	proportion	of	the	population	liv-
ing	below	the	poverty	 line	decreased	 from	46.7%	 in	2001	 to	 less	
than	3%	in	201438.	The	middle	class	grew	from	less	than	5%	in	2002	
to	over	65%	in	201339.	
Despite	these	doubtless	successes,	Kazakhstan	remains	depend-
ent	on	external	factors,	above	all	the	prices	of	mineral	raw	mate-
rials	(the	oil	and	gas	sector	generates	30%	of	GDP	and	two	thirds	of	
income	from	exports),	and	geopolitical	factors	–	transport	routes	
to	and	from	the	country	run	mainly	through	Russia	and	China.	
The	successful	management	of	the	vast	deposits	of	mineral	raw	ma-
terials	and	the	boom	on	the	oil	market	(and	more	broadly,	on	the	
raw	materials	market)	 impeded	 the	 diversification	 of	 the	 econo-
my,	successfully	weakening	the	stimuli	that	might	encourage	the	
36	 Kazakhstan	has,	for	example,	the	world’s	twelfth	largest	oil	deposits	(30	
billion	barrels)	and	is	the	world’s	largest	uranium	producer	(in	2013,	it	ac-
counted	for	38%	of	the	global	production	of	uranium).	Data	from:	https://
www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Ka-
zakhstan/kazakhstan.pdf,	 http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-
Profiles/Countries-G-N/Kazakhstan/
37	 Data	quoted	from	the	National	Statistical	Committee	of	Kazakhstan:	http://
www.stat.gov.kz/faces/wcnav_externalId/homeDinamika.pokazateli?_afr
Loop=21816240197846206#%40%3F_afrLoop%3D21816240197846206%26_adf.
ctrl-state%3Dutd375z0p_50
38	 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kazakhstan/overview
39	 The	middle	class	is	defined	here	as	a	group	of	people	who	can	spend	between	
US$10	and	US$100	daily	(according	to	purchasing	power	parity).	For	more	in-
formation,	see:	Multi-dimensional review of Kazakhstan,	OECD,	p.	53.	Available	
here:	http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/develop-
ment/multi-dimensional-review-of-kazakhstan_9789264246768-en#page55
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government	to	take	real	action	to	diversify	the	economy	–	revenues	
were	so	high	that	Kazakhstan	had	a	budget	surplus	every	year.	
As	regards	politics,	 the	concentration	of	economic	influence	in	
the	hands	of	the	state	and	of	small	groups	of	businessmen	linked	
to	the	government	has	been	a	problem.	Business-political	groups	
tend	to	expand	their	influence	beyond	the	initial	areas	of	their	
operation	 (for	 example,	 raw	materials)	 and	 create	 conglomer-
ates	of	a	certain	kind	(for	example,	by	expanding	their	 invest-
ments	to	banks).	This	adversely	affects	the	development	of	com-
petition	and	has	a	negative	impact	on	small	and	medium-sized	
businesses.	Nor	does	the	great	role	which	state-controlled	firms	
play	 in	 the	economy	contribute	 to	developing	competitiveness.	
Furthermore,	 the	state	also	applies	a	price	control	mechanism	
and	resorts	to	market	interventions,	which	hampers	the	devel-
opment	of	competition	and	is	beneficial	to	certain	business-po-
litical	groups.	
Diversification	was	also	hindered	by	the	high	level	of	dollarisation	
of	the	banking	sector	and	its	poor	condition	since	the	scandal	with	
BTA	Bank	which	is	owned	by	Mukhtar	Ablyazov,	an	oligarch	who	
was	tolerated	by	the	government	for	years.	The	case	of	BTA	Bank	
is	a	good	illustration	of	the	degree	to	which	business	is	dependent	
on	Nazarbayev	–	after	Ablyazov	fled	Kazakhstan,	 the	bank	was	
nationalised	and	Ablyazov	himself	was	accused	of	siphoning	off	
around	US$6	billion	from	the	bank.	This	case	clearly	shows	that	
absolute	loyalty	to	the	president	is	the	condition	necessary	for	do-
ing	business	in	Kazakhstan.	
The	 development	 of	 a	 competitive	 economy	 has	 also	 been	 held	
back	by	the	omnipresent	corruption,	the	low	quality	of	the	rule	
of	law,	the	inefficiency	of	the	state	administration	and	the	poor	or	
inadequate	qualifications	of	employees.	
As	regards	the	socio-political	sector,	the	factor	that	has	impeded	
any	 thorough	 state	 reforms	 has	 been	 the	 social	 contract	 under	
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which	 the	government	guarantees	prosperity	and	stability,	 and	
the	public	offers	support	in	return	(as	was	the	case	in	Russia	dur-
ing	Vladimir	Putin’s	first	two	terms	as	president).	
The	 consequences	 of	 this	 policy	 include	 people’s	 growing	 eco-
nomic	aspirations	and	their	increasing	political	indifference.	The	
new	middle	class	has	been	interested	in	keeping	the	status quo	in	
politics	(Nazarbayev’s	rule)	and	in	economic	terms	has	aimed	at	
maintaining	consumption	at	least	on	the	same	level	as	at	present40.	
The	government’s	operation	has	been	based	on	the	conviction	that	
social	and	political	stability	can	only	be	guaranteed	by	economic	
stability	and	satisfying	the	public’s	financial	needs.	This	convic-
tion	has	become	even	stronger41	since	the	Zhanaozen	crisis	which	
had	a	violent	ending	in	December	2011.	
zhanaozen 
Employees	 of	 Uzenmunaigaz	 (a	 company	 operating	 on	 the	
Zhanaozen	field	 in	 the	western	 part	 of	 the	 country	 close	 to	
the	border	with	Turkmenistan)	controlled	by	the	state-owned	
holding	 Samruk-Kazyna	 went	 on	 strike	 in	 2011.	 The	 strike	
lasted	 from	 spring	 to	December	 2011	 and	 ended	 in	 a	 violent	
pacification	 during	 which	 15	 people	 were	 killed.	 Riots	 also	
spilled	 over	 to	 other	 places	 in	 the	 region;	 for	 example,	 one	
more	person	was	killed	 in	Shetpe.	Zhanaozen	 is	an	 illustra-
tion	of	Kazakhstan’s	most	serious	problems:	
	– the	 public’s	 demanding	 attitude:	 the	 workers	 went	 on	
strike	 because	 they	wanted	 a	 pay	 rise,	 guarantees	 of	 the	
40	 Sociologist	Gulmira	 Ileuova	defines	 this	group	as	 the	 ‘bourgeois’,	http://
www.nomad.su/?a=10-201411100016
41	 One	effect	of	the	Zhanaozen	massacre	was	a	quick	settling	of	the	strike	in	
Zhezkazgan	at	the	beginning	of	2012,	where	the	workers’	demands	were	sat-
isfied	immediately	due	to	the	fear	of	more	serious	protests	(Zhezkazgan	is	
also	a	place	where	a	great	deal	of	Kazakh	fighters	in	Syria	are	recruited	from),	
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news
%5D=39357&cHash=05bd3e39714752981dd845afbaf3844d#.Vk4VVHYvfcs
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same	rights	to	local	and	foreign	employees,	and	restrictions	
on	the	operations	of	trade	unions	to	be	lifted;	
	– the	atomisation	of	society:	the	workers	on	strike	were	con-
demned,	 for	example,	 in	 the	nearby	city	of	Aktau,	whose	
residents	 believed	 that	 the	 workers	 already	 earned	 good	
money	and	were	demanding	 too	much;	 after	 the	 tragedy,	
families	 of	 the	 victims	 and	 others	 harmed	 by	 the	 events	
competed	for	damages	from	the	state,	not	stopping	short	of	
mutual	accusations;	
	– problems	 with	 the	 adaptation	 of	 the	 Kazakh	 immigrant	
population:	 residents	 of	Zhanaozen	were	 ethnic	Kazakhs	
who	had	 come,	 for	 example,	 from	Turkmenistan	 and	Uz-
bekistan	 (the	 oralman).	 The	 city’s	 population	 doubled	 be-
tween	2000	and	2010.	The	 returnees	were	 treated	by	 the	
residents	of	the	region	as	immigrants,	aliens;	
	– the	 authoritarian	 regime	 ineffectively	 dealt	 with	 local	
problems:	the	entire	state	apparatus	failed,	beginning	from	
local	government	of	all	levels	(which	disregarded	the	prob-
lem,	playing	on	time	and	trying	to	put	the	responsibility	for	
dealing	with	it	on	the	state-owned	company),	to	the	central	
government	(i.e.	the	president),	who	either	underestimated	
the	weight	of	the	problem	or	was	misinformed.	The	conse-
quences	 of	 the	 developments	 in	 Zhanaozen	 included	 the	
dismissal	 of	 Timur	Kulibayev,	 the	 president’s	 son-in-law,	
from	the	position	of	Samruk-Kazyna	holding’s	CEO,	and	the	
political	downfall	of	Aslan	Musin,	who	came	from	western	
Kazakhstan	and	served	as	the	head	of	the	presidential	ad-
ministration	at	the	time	of	the	massacre;
	– the	 ineffectiveness	 of	 the	 law	 enforcement	 agencies:	 the	
methods	used	were	inadequate	to	the	threat	and	led	to	un-
necessary	killings.	The	government	had	to	use	aircraft	of	
the	commercial	airline	Air	Astana	to	transport	its	troops	to	
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Zhanaozen,	because	the	internal	troops	had	no	equipment	
of	their	own.	
The	Zhanaozen	massacre	laid	bare	the	downsides	of	the	gov-
ernment	but	it	also	revealed	its	willingness	to	implement	re-
forms.	 Since	 the	 pacification,	 the	Ministry	 for	 Regional	 De-
velopment	has	been	established	and	a	special	agenda	for	the	
development	of	mono-cities,	 i.e.	urban	centres	dependent	on	
a	single	industrial	plant	(around	1.5	million	people	live	in	such	
cities	 in	Kazakhstan),	has	been	developed.	Law	enforcement	
agencies	have	been	reformed	and	modernised;	their	ability	to	
respond	to	similar	threats	has	been	improved.	Zhanaozen	was	
the	first	in	a	sequence	of	serious	impulses	to	reform	the	state.	
4. The challenges on the international arena
The	 ever	 more	 complicated	 international	 environment	 is	 a	 re-
sult	of	the	changing	global	balance	of	forces	and	also	affects	the	
situation	 in	Central	Asia	 and	Kazakhstan	 itself.	 It	 provides	 the	
backdrop	for	a	crisis	looming	on	the	horizon.	From	Astana’s	point	
of	 view,	 the	 country’s	 geopolitical	 situation	 leaves	 it	 no	 other	
choice	but	to	co-operate	with	Russia	and	China,	Kazakhstan’s	two	
strongest	and	closest	neighbours.	 In	turn,	a	skilful	balancing	of	
influence	between	them	may	open	up	a	field	for	co-operation	with	
other	important	partners,	such	as	the	West	(the	USA	and	the	EU),	
the	countries	in	South-Eastern	Asia	and	the	Persian	Gulf,	Turkey,	
etc.	Astana’s	policy	is	characterised	by	avoiding	conflicts	and	by	
an	 ostentatious	 openness	 to	 co-operation	with	 all	willing	 part-
ners42.	 President	 Nazarbayev	 has	 for	 years	 formulated	 foreign	
policy	guidelines	of	 this	kind,	even	 though	Russia	has	been	 the	
most	important	point	of	reference	in	Kazakhstan’s	foreign	policy.	
This	is	an	effect	of	close	bonds	existing	in	the	area	of	security	and	
42	 Manifestations	of	this	include	the	president	declaring	in	one	breath	open-
ness	to	co-operation	with	Russia,	China	and	the	West	in	his	annual	speeches,	
and	his	mediation	initiatives	concerning	Nagorno-Karabakh,	Iran,	Ukraine,	
Syria	and	other	conflict	areas.	
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the	 economy	–	 for	 example,	Kazakhstan	 relies	 on	 the	 transit	 of	
goods	(including	oil)	via	Russian	territory.	
The	fact	that	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union	is	turning	into	a	po-
litical	instrument	used	by	Moscow	to	regain	its	influence	in	the	
post-Soviet	area43	is	seen	as	a	threat	to	maintaining	the	interna-
tional	policy	lines	existing	so	far,	as	are	the	conflict	which	Russia	
provoked	with	Ukraine	and	the	Kremlin’s	increasingly	confronta-
tional	policy	(for	example,	in	dealing	with	the	West	and	Turkey).	
Russia’s	aggressive	policy	has	forced	Astana	to	manoeuvre	in	such	
ways	as	to	remain	as	autonomous	as	possible	from	Moscow,	how-
ever,	without	risking	a	conflict	with	it.	Astana’s	stance	on	Russia’s	
annexation	of	Crimea	is	a	good	illustration	of	this	approach.	The	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	Kazakhstan	recognised	the	refer-
endum	in	Crimea,	viewing	it	as	a	manifestation	of	 its	residents’	
free	 choice.	 However,	 officially,	 Kazakhstan	 has	 never	 directly	
recognised	the	annexation	of	Crimea	by	Russia44,	and	abstained	
from	the	vote	at	the	UN	forum	on	the	resolution	condemning	Rus-
sia’s	moves	in	Crimea.	Kazakhstan	has	also	made	efforts	to	show	
Russia	the	benefits	of	its	maintaining	good	relations	with	the	West	
and	Turkey	(for	example,	by	offering	itself	as	a	mediator,	which	in	
practice	would	mean	acting	as	an	intermediary	in	the	Ukrainian	
or	the	Turkish-Russian	conflicts	–	however,	such	offers	have	been	
consistently	ignored	by	Russia).	Officially,	Astana	invariably	de-
clares	its	desire	for	strategic	co-operation	with	Moscow	and	has	
joined	integration	projects	which	are	essential	for	Moscow,	such	
as	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union.	However,	Kazakhstan	has	made	
efforts	 to	defend	 its	 interests	 in	 cases	of	 less	 significance,	often	
successfully,	but	never	affecting	Moscow’s	prestige	on	the	inter-
national	arena.	
43	 The	breakthrough	moment	came	when	Russia	forced	Armenia	to	withdraw	
from	signing	the	Association	Agreement	with	the	EU	(September	2013)	and	
join	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union	instead.	
44	 When	the	Ukrainian	embassy	protested	in	autumn	2015	to	Crimea	being	pre-
sented	as	a	part	of	Russia	in	a	Kazakh	textbook,	the	ministry	of	education	
promised	it	would	“see	to	this	matter”	and	then	it	hushed	up	the	problem.	
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Russia’s	 increasingly	 aggressive	 policy	 is	 making	 maintaining	
the	status quo	 in	foreign	policy	ever	more	difficult.	Putin’s	state-
ment	during	the	Seliger	forum	in	August	2014	became	a	symbol	
of	Russian	pressure	and	a	warning	to	Kazakhstan.	He	said	then	
that	Kazakhs	had	not	had	a	state	of	their	own	before	Nazarbayev	
and	praised	the	president	of	Kazakhstan	for	his	friendly	policy	to-
wards	Russia.	This	was	understood	by	Nazarbayev	as	a	warning	
that	Kazakhstan	might	lose	its	statehood	if	it	stopped	respecting	
the	interests	of	Russia’s	neo-imperial	policy45,	i.e.	if	it	opposed	be-
coming	more	and	more	dependent	on	Russia	at	the	expense	of	its	
sovereignty.	This	aggressive	policy	of	Russia’s	and	the	perceived	
threat	of	separatism	or	destabilisation	being	plotted	in	the	north-
ern	part	of	Kazakhstan	(and	such	sentiments	have	been	skilfully	
stoked	by	Russian	politicians)46,	is	one	of	the	main	engines	driving	
internal	policy.	While	it	can	be	disputed	whether	Russia	would	be	
able	to	generate	separatism	in	northern	parts	of	Kazakhstan	(the	
regions:	 Northern	 Kazakhstan,	 Pavlodar	 and	 Eastern	 Kazakh-
stan),	there	is	no	doubt	that	Russia	would	be	able	to	cause	desta-
bilisation	in	individual	regions	of	Kazakhstan,	especially	during	
the	succession	process.	For	these	reasons,	Russia	and	its	policy	are	
the	most	serious	factors	affecting	Kazakhstan’s	domestic	policy.	
45	 It	is	symptomatic	that,	apart	from	one	Kazakh	MP,	no	one	has	made	an	official	
comment	on	Putin’s	statement.	
46	 Statements	by	Vladimir	Zhirinovsky,	the	deputy	speaker	of	the	State	Duma,	
the	lower	house	of	the	Russian	parliament,	who	has	suggested	that	Central	
Asia	be	transformed	into	an	entity	of	the	Russian	Federation;	the	statement	
by	Eduard	Limonov,	who	is	linked	to	The	Other	Russia	party,	who	has	sug-
gested	that	northern	regions	of	Kazakhstan	be	included	in	Russia.	Astana	
sent	a	note	of	protest	in	response	to	Zhirinovsky’s	suggestion.	In	turn,	it	was	
debated	in	public	whether	Limonov	should	be	sued	for	what	he	had	said.	
Another	example	was	the	demonstration	organised	by	The	Other	Russia	in	
front	of	Kazakhstan’s	consulate	in	St.	Petersburg	in	defence	of	ethnic	Rus-
sians	convicted	for	separatism	in	Kazakhstan.	The	demonstration	was	held	
on	25	December	2015,	on	the	25th	anniversary	of	Kazakhstan	regaining	inde-
pendence.	
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ii. the counteractions 
With	all	 its	weaknesses,	Kazakhstan	has	responded	to	all	the	is-
sues	presented	above	by	speeding	up	reforms.	The	way	the	govern-
ment	has	reacted	is	an	extension	of	the	previous	trends	–	Kazakh-
stan	has	been	undergoing	reforms	endlessly	and	has	actively	used	
international	support	in	the	process	of	modernisation	of	some	ele-
ments	of	the	state	since	the	onset	of	its	independence.	The	ability	
to	adjust	the	previous	policy	to	reduce	problems	is	what	makes	Ka-
zakhstan	distinct	from	all	other	post-Soviet	countries	where	au-
thoritarian	systems	apply	–	in	Kazakhstan,	any	crisis	usually	leads	
to	reshuffles	within	the	elite	and	increases	surveillancetypical,	for	
example,	of	Azerbaijan)	but	also	triggers	modifications	in	the	way	
the	 country	 is	 governed.	 Examples	 of	 this	 include	 the	 violently	
suppressed	strike	in	Zhanaozen	or	the	problems	with	local	Islamic	
radicalism,	which	is	being	resolved	not	by	intensifying	repression	
but	rather	using	a	combination	of	instruments	of	surveillance	and	
soft	methods	aimed	at	making	radical	Islam	seem	less	appealing47.	
The	fact	that	another	Zhanaozen	has	not	yet	taken	place	is	proof	of	
the	relative	effectiveness	of	the	methods	applied.	
The	 set	 of	 reforms	 being	 implemented	 at	 present	 is	 viewed	 as	
a	response	to	the	crisis	and	is	reminiscent	of	the	reforms	in	the	
1990s,	due	to	their	scale.	The	domestic	policy	is	being	adjusted	and	
the	state	is	being	modernised	at	the	same	time.	The	common	de-
nominator	of	all	these	moves	is	the	desire	to	build	a	strong	state	
through	reinforcing	its	institutions	and	also	through	the	consoli-
dation	of	the	Kazakh	public	based	on	the	sense	of	national	pride,	
a	 common	 historical	 legacy,	 and	 shared	 pro-state	 values.	 Thus	
Kazakhstan’s	 actions	 are	 at	 variance	 with	 the	 new	 doctrine	 of	
Russian	dominance	in	the	post-Soviet	area48,	intended	at	limiting	
47	 Cf.	Maciej	Falkowski,	Józef	Lang,	Homo	Jiihadicus,	OSW Report,	September	
2015,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/homojihadicus.pdf
48	 For	more	on	this	issue	see:	Marek	Menkiszak,	The	Putin	doctrine:	The	for-
mation	of	a	conceptual	framework	for	Russian	dominance	in	the	post-Soviet	
area,	OSW Commentary,	 27	March	2014,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
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the	sovereignty	of	post-Soviet	countries	(for	example,	by	prevent-
ing	them	from	participating	in	any	integration	projects	that	are	
alternative	to	the	Russian	ones,	and	maintaining	the	post-Soviet	
model	of	development).	Meanwhile,	Kazakhstan	has	taken	pains	
to	speed	up	the	processes	of	forming	a	new	political	nation,	and	
is	copying	the	solutions	adopted	in	the	West	or	Eastern	Asia	in	its	
policy	of	modernising	and	strengthening	the	state.	It	has	been	im-
plementing	all	these	solutions	top-down,	in	a	manner	typical	of	
authoritarianism.	Paradoxically,	Kazakhstan	is	viewed	as	one	of	
Russia’s	most	faithful	allies,	but	it	does	not	draw	on	the	Russian	
experience	but	instead	searches	for	guidelines	for	its	further	de-
velopment	 in	 the	West	 (for	example,	 through	co-operation	with	
the	OECD	and	the	EU)	as	Eastern	Asian	states	have	done	before	
them.	 In	 fact,	 the	 strategy	being	currently	 implemented	by	Ka-
zakhstan	 envisages	 breaking	 the	mental	 bonds	with	 the	 Soviet	
era	and	puts	it	at	risk	of	conflict	with	Russia.	
1. Reinforcing the state institutions
Improving	the	operation	of	state	institutions	is	at	the	core	of	the	
reforms	 currently	being	 implemented.	Three	 out	 of	 the	five	 so-
called	‘institutional	reforms’49	announced	in	March	this	year	and	
implemented	 in	 co-operation	 mainly	 with	 the	 OECD50	 directly	
raise	the	issue	of	improving	the	efficiency	of	existing	institutions.	
The	declared	goal	is	to	create	an	effective	administrative	and	bu-
reaucratic	apparatus,	introducing	the	rule	of	law	and	increasing	
the	 state’s	 responsibility	 towards	 its	 citizens.	Another	objective	
is	 to	 build	 strong	 institutions,	 free	 from	 nepotism,	 which	 will	
likacje/osw-commentary/2014-03-27/putin-doctrine-formation-a-concep-
tual-framework-russian
49	 The	plan	of	concrete	legislative	changes,	the	so-called	‘One	hundred	concrete	
steps’,	was	announced	by	Nazarbayev	in	May	2015.	Its	content	is	available,	
for	example,	here:	http://www.mid.gov.kz/en/kategorii/100-konkretnyh-
shagov-0
50	 Kazakhstan	signed	a	co-operation	agreement	with	the	OECD	to	this	effect	in	
January	2015.
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operate	 efficiently	 regardless	 of	 who	 governs	 the	 country	 and	
how.	 Streamlining	 the	 operation	 of	 institutions	 is	 expected	 to	
be	 achieved	without	 the	need	 to	 introduce	 any	 thorough	politi-
cal	changes;	instead	it	will	be	done	by	getting	rid	of	the	corrupt	
bureaucratic	mentality.	An	effective	and	efficient	administration	
has	been	identified	as	a	necessary	condition	for	making	further	
changes	in	the	state	and	as	the	government’s	priority.	In	this	con-
text,	the	reforms	in	Kazakhstan	are	an	Asian-style	implementa-
tion	 of	 legislative	 solutions	 recommended	 by	Western	 interna-
tional	 organisations	 as	 long	 as	 it	 does	not	 directly	 threaten	 the	
authoritarian	 regime.	 In	 this	 context,	 Kazakhstan’s	 moves	 are	
reminiscent	of	the	situation	in	South	Korea	in	1960-1980.	
The	changes	envisage	introducing:	a	new	multi-stage	system	for	
recruiting	 public	 servants,	 a	 precisely	 determined	 path	 of	 pro-
motion	dependent	on	professionalism,	the	system	for	evaluating	
public	 servants	and	remunerating	 them	depending	on	work	re-
sults,	the	requirement	to	guarantee	adequate	accommodation	to	
public	servants	(but	not	ownership,	which	is	expected	to	contrib-
ute	to	their	loyalty	to	the	state),	the	opportunities	to	improve	one’s	
competences	(the	requirement	to	attend	qualification	upgrading	
courses	at	least	once	every	three	years),	the	possibility	to	employ	
foreign	specialists	in	the	state	administration	and	a	new	code	of	
conduct	for	public	servants.	One	of	the	ways	to	put	an	end	to	the	
system	based	on	loyalty	to	political	patrons	is	to	restrict	the	pos-
sibility	of	staff	rotation	in	the	civil	service	–	a	person	moving	to	
another	 managerial	 position	 can	 take	 only	 one	 employee	 with	
them.	A	public	administration	unit	is	to	be	created	at	the	Agency	
for	Civil	 Service	Affairs	 and	Fighting	Corruption	 established	 in	
2014	in	order	to	curb	corruption	more	strongly.	
The	reforms	also	envisage	a	decentralisation	of	the	decision-mak-
ing	process	–	individual	government	offices	will	be	given	freedom	
to	decided	how	to	implement	the	tasks	entrusted	to	them	and	will	
be	made	accountable	for	the	effects	of	 their	work	annually	(and	
for	programme	implementation	once	in	three	years).	The	number	
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of	government	programmes	to	be	implemented	will	be	reduced	to	
improve	the	cohesion	and	effectiveness	of	their	implementation.	
The	changes	will	 also	cover	 the	 judiciary.	These	 include	 the	 in-
troduction	of	a	simplified	three-instance	judiciary	procedure	(in	
place	of	the	present	five-instance	procedure),	stricter	criteria	for	
appointing	judges,	a	code	of	conduct,	compulsory	audio-visual	re-
cording	of	court	sessions,	an	increased	role	for	the	jury	and	a	re-
duced	role	 for	 the	public	prosecutor	 in	civil	cases.	Special	 focus	
will	be	put	on	economic	courts	which	consider	cases	concerning	
investors.	 A	 specialist	 economic	 court	 attached	 to	 the	 Supreme	
Court	is	to	be	established,	and	a	court	of	arbitration,	modelled	on	
the	 institution	operating	 in	Dubai,	will	 function	at	 the	 Interna-
tional	Financial	Centre	in	Astana	starting	from	2017.	
The	reforms	are	expected	to	also	cover	the	police	through	adopt-
ing	a	stricter	procedure	for	recruiting	police	workers	and	intro-
ducing	 a	 system	 for	 the	 evaluation	 of	 active	 police	 officers,	 es-
tablishing	a	municipal	police	force	which	will	report	to	the	local	
government,	and	public	councils	which	will	consider	complaints	
against	the	municipal	police.	
The	changes	in	the	judiciary	and	the	police	show	that	Kazakhstan	
does	 not	 intend	 to	 disassemble	 the	 institutions	 completely	 and	
build	them	anew	(as	was	the	case	with	the	police	reform	in	Geor-
gia),	but	wants	to	streamline	their	operation	through	evolution-
ary	changes	and	a	gradual	replacement	of	staff.	This	solution	has	
been	chosen	out	of	fear	of	destabilising	the	system,	but	it	will	ad-
versely	affect	the	effectiveness	of	the	reforms	(cf.	the	unsuccess-
ful	judiciary	reform	in	Georgia51).
The	 reforms	 also	 provide	 for	 developing	 the	 local	 government	
system	through	the	 introduction	of	 independent	budgets	on	the	
51	 http://silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2015-popjanevs-
ki-retribution-and-the-rule-of-law-the-politics-of-justice-in-georgia.pdf
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lowest	levels	of	local	administration	(regional	towns	and	villages)	
and	allowing	residents	to	participate	in	work	on	this.	Citizens	will	
receive	 better	 access	 to	 information,	 public	 councils	will	 be	 es-
tablished	at	the	akimats	(city	halls,	regional	offices,	etc.)	and	will	
perform	a	consultative	function.	Finally,	all	state	services	will	be	
offered	by	a	single	citizen	service	centre	(named	‘The	government	
for	 citizens’)	 to	be	built	 on	 the	basis	 of	 resident	 service	 centres	
which	have	been	operating	for	several	years	and	have	been	evalu-
ated	very	well,	owing	 to	which	corruption	has	been	reduced	on	
the	lowest	levels	of	administration.	
The	reforms	satisfy	the	aspirations	of	the	young	members	of	the	
elite	 and	 create	 space	 for	 the	 competences	 of	 the	 so-called	 ‘Bo-
lashak	graduates’52	to	be	taken	advantage	of.	The	term	‘Bolashak	
graduates’	refers	 to	Kazakhs	who	have	benefited	from	the	Bola-
shak	Scholarship	Programme	and	whose	education	at	foreign	uni-
versities	(mainly	in	the	USA	and	the	United	Kingdom)	has	been	
funded	by	public	money;	they	definitely	support	reform,	and	are	
representatives	of	 the	young	generation	who	were	born	 in	Naz-
arbayev’s	 Kazakhstan.	 Proofs	 of	 the	 great	 hopes	 pinned	 on	 Bo-
lashak	graduates	 include	 the	appointment	of	Baurzhan	Baybek,	
one	of	the	programme’s	graduates,	as	akim of	Almaty,	and	the	fact	
that	the	Agency	for	Civil	Service	Affairs	and	Fighting	Corruption	
and	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	present	the	number	of	Bolas-
hak	graduates	employed	as	an	indicator	of	their	efficiency.	From	
Nazarbayev’s	point	of	view,	Bolashak	graduates	are	an	important	
base	for	implementing	reforms.	However,	they	have	so	far	acted	
as	deputies.	The	nomination	of	Baybek	for	mayor	of	Almaty	is	in-
tended	to	check	(and	to	demonstrate	to	the	sceptical	post-Soviet	
elite)	whether	Bolashak	graduates	 are	mature	 enough	 to	 accept	
greater	responsibility	for	governing	the	country.	
52	 A	total	of	almost	12,000	citizens	of	Kazakhstan	have	been	granted	the	schol-
arship	since	the	launch	of	the	Bolashak	Programme.	The	programme	has	
evolved	over	time.	At	present,	it	imposes	the	obligation	to	work	for	five	years	
in	state	administration	structures	after	graduation.	
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Nazarbayev	himself	treats	the	reforms	as	a	way	of	overcoming	the	
internal	crisis	and	also	a	way	to	remain	in	power	and	maintain	
stability.	The	speed	of	the	changes	introduced	in	state	institutions	
and	 the	president’s	 rhetoric	emphasising	 the	 joint	 effort	 (which	
some	have	called	‘psychotherapy’53)	are	intended	to	distract	pub-
lic	attention	from	the	deteriorating	economic	situation	and	to	put	
the	blame	for	it	on	external	factors.	Holding	snap	parliamentary	
and	 local	 elections	on	20	March	was	a	way	 to	 channel	growing	
dissatisfaction.	The	elections	have	also	become	part	of	the	process	
of	replacing	the	political	elite	with	a	younger	one54	and	promoting	
pluralism	in	the	system	in	order	to	mobilise	public	support	for	the	
ongoing	modernisation.	
A	successful	implementation	of	the	reforms	would	be	a	large	step	
towards	activating	and	strengthening	the	role	of	the	formal	state	
institutions,	and	would	also	make	it	possible	to	stop	and	resolve	
minor	conflicts	on	 the	 lower	 levels,	 thus	protecting	 the	govern-
ment	and	preventing	crises	 from	erupting	However,	 this	would	
also	 lead	 to	 at	 least	 some	 sections	 of	 society	being	made	 active,	
which	potentially	poses	the	risk	of	destabilisation55.	
53	 Cf.	an	interview	with	Aidos	Sarym:	https://www.facebook.com/ratel.kz/
posts/487619861410324:0
54	 Cf.	Aleksandra	Jarosiewicz,	Kazakhstan:	anti-crisis	parliamentary	elections,	
OSW Analyses,	27	January	2016,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/anal-
yses/2016-01-27/kazakhstan-anti-crisis-parliamentary-elections
55	 In	late	April/early	May	2016	protests	provoked	by	changes	in	the	Land	Code	
rolled	through	Kazakhstan.	The	government	use	persuasion	to	stamp	out	
the	protests	(government	representatives	met	with	citizens	in	Atyrau,	Ak-
tobe,	Semey,	Uralsk	and	Kyzylorda)	and	principally	shunned	violent	methods	
(a	harmless	fracas	took	place,	for	example,	in	Kyzylorda).	The	protests	were	
provoked	by	the	fear	of	Chinese	expansion,	but	in	the	broader	context,	they	
were	a	result	and	a	symptom	of	the	socio-economic	crisis	about	to	explode.	At	
the	same	time,	the	protests	were	a	side	effect	of	the	reform	process	which	has	
made	more	room	for	the	government’s	actions	to	be	criticised,	has	allowed	
peaceful	demonstrations	and	has	in	fact	contributed	to	the	development	of	
Kazakh	nationalism.	Finally,	the	protests	were	stopped	by	Nazarbayev’s	de-
cision	to	introduce	a	moratorium	on	the	changes	in	the	code,	which	was	ac-
companied	by	the	dismissals	of	two	ministers.	
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The	lack	of	change	in	the	political	system	would	undermine	the	
effect	 of	 the	 reforms,	 above	 all	 the	 continuing	 structural	 prob-
lem	of	unresolved	succession	after	Nazarbayev.	It	seems	that	the	
president’s	statements	suggesting	that	the	role	of	the	parliament	
and	government	could	be	strengthened	at	the	expense	of	his	own	
powers	are	intended	to	test	how	this	solution	will	be	received	by	
the	elite	and	the	public.	From	Nazarbayev’s	point	of	view,	replac-
ing	 the	government	system	with	a	more	collegial	one	may	have	
a	stabilising	effect	and	reduce	the	risk	of	reversing	the	direction	
he	sets	for	the	country’s	development.	If	this	is	the	case,	Kazakh-
stan’s	political	system	would	head	towards	authoritarianism,	with	
a	 strong	 strain	of	 corporatism,	where	 the	 struggle	between	 the	
various	interest	groups	would	at	least	partly	be	moved	from	the	
presidential	palace	to	the	parliamentary	forum.	A	renewed	par-
liament,	with	the	system	of	 licensed	political	parties	preserved,	
is	a	step	towards	such	a	system.	The	lack	of	a	structural	solution	
to	the	issue	of	succession	will	contribute	to	deepening	instability	
after	Nazarbayev’s	death	and	will	reduce	the	room	for	manoeuvre	
for	system	reforms.	This	means	that	the	present	series	of	reforms,	
given	 both	 its	 depth	 and	 the	 context	 of	 implementation	 (crisis)	
may	have	a	decisive	impact	on	the	country’s	future.	
The	implementation	of	the	reforms	is	likely	to	be	hindered	by	the	
institutions	themselves	above	all	due	to	the	mentality	of	the	bu-
reaucratic	apparatus,	which	has	an	 inherent	fear	of	any	change	
or	 loss	of	position.	Changes	will	also	be	blocked	by	 the	existing	
local	 and	 clan	 deals56	 and	 the	 post-Soviet	mentality.	 This	 is	 the	
56	 One	example	of	difficulties	in	reforming	the	state	administration	is	provided	
by	the	case	of	Artur	Nigmetov,	who	was	appointed	spokesman	in	July	2015	
by	the	new	akim of	Almaty,	Baurzhan	Baybek.	Nigmetov	resigned	from	his	
position	after	a	few	weeks,	saying	he	was	unwilling	to	be	part	of	the	games	
played	as	part	of	the	‘local	deal’	(he	announced	and	explained	his	decision	on	
his	Facebook	profile).	As	a	consequence,	Baybek	dismissed	all	of	his	deputies	
and	made	changes	in	the	bureaucratic	apparatus.	It	is	symptomatic	that	both	
Baybek	and	Nigmetov	received	education	in	the	West	(Germany	and	Finland)	
and	are	examples	of	the	new	part	of	society	who	support	reforms,	are	able	
to	co-operate	with	the	state	apparatus	and	are	willing	to	become	engaged	in	
reform.	
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reason	why	 Nazarbayev	 has	 recommended	 amendments	 to	 the	
civil	service	act	that	will	force	the	dismissals	of	public	servants	
of	pensionable	age.	The	 state	apparatus	 is	 likely	 to	obstruct	 the	
changes	in	order	to	maintain	for	as	long	as	possible	the	benefits	
of	the	corrupt	practices	used	so	far.	This	will	be	counteracted	by	
the	 Agency	 for	 Civil	 Service	 Affairs	 and	 Fighting	 Corruption57,	
which	reports	directly	to	the	president.	The	country’s	difficult	fi-
nancial	situation	will	generate	tension	among	the	elite	and	also	
make	 economising	 on	 expenses	 necessary,	 and	 public	 pressure	
will	contribute	to	this58.	
It	is	too	early	to	make	a	conclusive	evaluation	of	the	effects	of	the	
reforms,	 above	 all	 because	 their	 implementation	 began	 in	 late	
2015	and	early	2016.	However,	the	scale	of	the	changes	alone	signi-
fies	that	the	reforms	are	an	effect	of	Nazarbayev’s	belief	that	the	
lack	of	serious	institutional	and	political	changes,	given	the	dete-
riorating	economic	and	geopolitical	situation,	will	lead	to	internal	
destabilisation,	subordination	to	Russia	and,	as	a	consequence,	to	
Kazakhstan	losing	what	it	has	achieved	so	far.	In	his	narrative	to	
the	public	and	the	elite,	Nazarbayev	emphasises	the	need	to	make	
a	joint	effort59	and	joint	sacrifices.	He	also	warns	that	the	present	
system	may	collapse;	this	in	fact	is	aimed	at	mobilising	members	
of	 the	 elite	 to	 implement	 the	 reforms.	Kazakhstan’s	 situation	 is	
quite	difficult	because,	given	the	demanding	attitude	represented	
57	 Under	a	presidential	decree	on	11	December	2015	it	was	transformed	into	the	
Ministry	for	Civil	Service	Affairs	and	Fighting	Corruption.	
58	 For	example,	publishing	information	on	social	networking	services	on	offi-
cials	abusing	power	while	using	staff	cars.	Another	example	of	public	pres-
sure	has	been	seen	in	the	crusade	of	a	Karaganda	student,	who	has	been	
successfully	stigmatising	policemen,	for	example,	for	failing	to	comply	with	
road	traffic	rules,	http://today.kz/news/zhizn/2015-11-01/701641-karagand-
inskij-student-dobilsya-nakazaniya-100-politsejskih
59	 For	example,	appealing	to	the	public	to	take	part	in	privatisation	and	to	busi-
ness	circles	to	invest	in	Kazakhstan	and	thus	contribute	to	diversifying	the	
economy.	However,	this	does	not	work	because	the	legalisation	of	capital	has	
covered	US$1	billion	since	2014,	while	it	is	estimated	that	US$167	billion	was	
siphoned	off	Kazakhstan	in	2004-2013	(http://www.gfintegrity.org/report/
illicit-financial-flows-from-developing-countries-2004-2013/).	
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by	the	public	and	the	ruling	class	alike,	carrying	out	the	reforms	
is	as	risky	as	abandoning	them	and	may	lead	to	internal	upheaval.	
However,	Nazarbayev’s	presence	in	the	system	(playing	the	role	
of	a	good	khan)	provides	 the	opportunity	 to	 reduce	 the	 scale	of	
potential	destabilisation.	
The	implementation	of	the	reforms	will	also	depend	on	the	deter-
mination	of	Nazarbayev	himself	and	on	his	ability	to	activate	at	
least	part	of	the	elite	and	public	 interested	in	changing	the	sys-
tem.	On	the	other	hand,	reforms	will	be	hampered	due	to	resist-
ance	from	the	administration,	the	old	government	elite	and	busi-
ness	and	political	groups,	as	well	as	Nazarbayev’s	fear	of	intensive	
public	protests	in	a	situation	where	the	financial	wellbeing	of	the	
people	is	declining.	
2. Consolidation of society 
The	overriding	goal	of	Kazakhstan’s	internal	policy	is	to	consoli-
date	the	public	around	the	one	common	idea,	i.e.	of	Kazakhstan	as	
a	separate	and	sovereign	state.	This	goal	is	not	directly	formulat-
ed	by	the	government,	but	Nazarbayev,	the	official	narrative	and	
also	 so-called	 ‘national	 patriotic’	 circles	 (Kazakh	 nationalists)60	
all	emphasise	 that	Kazakhstan	 is	a	sovereign	country61	and	this	
is	transforming	it	into	the	main	idea	behind	the	government’s	ac-
60	 ‘National	patriots’	is	the	collective	definition	of	the	circles	propagating	Ka-
zakh	nationalism.	Its	main	claims	are:	traditionalism,	increasing	the	role	of	
the	Kazakh	language,	anti-colonialism,	economic	nationalism	(not	allow-
ing	land	to	be	sold	to	foreigners)	and	ecological	nationalism	(opposing	the	
operation	of	Baikonur)	and	not	allowing	Kazakhstan	lose	its	sovereignty	due	
to	the	rebirth	of	a	new	Soviet	Union.	For	more	on	this	subject	see:	Serik	Bey-
sembayev,	Fenomen	Kazakhskogo	natsionalizma	v	kontekste	segodnyash-
nei	politiki:	ot	otritsaniya	k	ponimaniyu.	Available	on	the	website	http://
ru.soros.kz/uploads/user_68/2015_23_09__03_46_44__219.pdf
61	 For	example,	Nazarbayev’s	statement	in	August	2014,	when	he	said	that	Ka-
zakhstan	might	leave	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union,	if	this	put	its	sover-
eignty	at	stake.	Also,	the	manner	in	which	the	official	media	reported	on	
Kazakhstan’s	signing	the	Treaty	of	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union,	emphasis-
ing	the	state’s	sovereignty.	
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tions.	This	policy	is	nothing	new	–	Kazakhstan	has	made	similar	
moves	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 its	 independence.	What	 is	 new	 is	
its	 intensification	 in	the	face	of	Russia’s	actions:	 the	annexation	
of	Crimea	and	the	creation	of	separatism	in	eastern	Ukraine.	The	
numerous	 statements	 from	 Russian	 politicians	 questioning	 the	
meaning	of	Kazakhstan’s	existence	in	its	present	form	have	also	
acted	as	a	stimulant.	Other	concepts	and	notions	used	by	the	gov-
ernment	 are	 imprecise	 (e.g.	 ecology,	 tolerance,	 the	Kazakh	 lan-
guage,	 family,	 hospitality,	 respect,	 patriotism62),	 but	 even	 their	
imprecisely	determined	content	are	aimed	at	building	a	sense	of	
pride	in	the	achievements	of	the	state	and	the	nation,	in	the	fact	of	
being	a	citizen	of	Kazakhstan	or	a	Kazakh.	
In	effect,	 the	government’s	 identity	policy	has	been	built	on	the	
practical	 level	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 Russian	 narrative	 (the	 anti-
Chinese	narrative	 and	 stoking	anti-Chinese	phobias	 existing	 in	
society	were	much	more	important	a	few	years	ago),	even	though	
on	 the	 political	 level	 Kazakhstan	 has	 consistently	 emphasised	
that	 it	 is	Russia’s	strategic	partner.	The	situation	 is	additionally	
complicated	by	the	fact	that	the	Kazakh	public	remains	within	the	
range	of	influence	of	Russia’s	media	and	culture.	It	is	also	princi-
pally	pro-Russian	and	fears	Chinese	expansion	(this	fear	has	been	
fomented	by	the	Russian	media	for	years).	In	the	case	of	Kazakh-
stan	it	 is	 the	government	elite	 (especially	 its	younger	members,	
who	 have	 been	 educated	 in	 the	West)	who	 are	more	 concerned	
than	the	public	(with	the	exception	of	Kazakh	nationalist	circles)	
about	the	threat	posed	by	Russia,	namely	its	civilisational	and	po-
litical	dominance.	
On	the	practical	level,	the	concept	upon	which	social	consolidation	
is	to	be	constructed	is	the	rather	imprecise	notion	known	as	Men-
gilik El	(literally,	‘the	eternal	state’).	However,	the	contents	propa-
gated	as	part	of	Mengilik El	will	vary	depending	on	whether	they	
62	 Cf.	the	content	promoted	during	social	campaigns	in	Kazakhstan,	http://
www.socreklama.kz/video/
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concern	Kazakhs	or	non-Kazakhs.	On	the	general	level,	Mengilik 
El	draws	upon	sovereignty,	unity,	peace	and	agreement	between	
the	various	ethnic	groups,	spiritual	values,	and	also	secularism	
(cf.	the	presidential	address	on	Nurly	Zhol	in	2014)	and	shows	re-
gard	to	all	citizens	of	Kazakhstan.	In	turn,	for	Kazakhs,	the	no-
tion	of	Mengilik El	 is	 strongly	associated	with	 the	Kazakh	tradi-
tion	and	values,	and	means,	for	example,	promoting	knowledge	of	
the	Kazakh	language,	culture	and	tradition63,	and	does	not	need	to	
be	sanctioned	on	the	state	level	because	it	is	already	internalised.	
This	ambiguity	finally	forced	Nazarbayev	to	commission	work	at	
the	beginning	of	2016	to	develop	a	coherent	concept	of	Mengilik El	
as	an	element	of	building	the	modern	Kazakh	nation.	
The	state	still	conveys	a	dual-track	message	to	the	Kazakh-speak-
ing	and	the	Russian-speaking	parts	of	society	as	part	of	its	present	
policy64.	The	narrative	addressed	to	ethnic	Kazakhs	draws	above	
all	upon	Kazakh	traditions,	while	the	Russian-language	narrative	
emphasises	the	significance	of	peace	between	the	various	ethnic	
groups	and	tolerance.	However,	it	is	also	discretely	communicat-
ed	that	Kazakhstan	is	first	of	all	the	country	of	ethnic	Kazakhs.	
For	example,	the	social	campaign	promoting	the	slogan	‘One	state,	
one	 nation,	 one	 destiny’	 is	 reminiscent	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 nations	
from	all	over	the	Soviet	Union	were	exiled	to	Kazakhstan	in	the	
Soviet	era	and	met	with	hospitality65,	and	that	Kazakhs	fought	on	
the	 fronts	of	World	War	 II	 to	 the	same	extent	as	Russians	did66.	
One	 example	 of	 emphasising	 the	 role	played	by	Kazakhs	 in	 the	
63	 For	more	information	on	problems	with	defining	the	meaning	of	Mengilik 
El	see:	http://www.ofstrategy.kz/index.php/ru/research/politic-research/
item/443-po-predvaritelnym-rezultatam-ekspertnykh-intervyu-u-pred-
stavitelej-kazakhskoj-tvorcheskoj-intelligentsii-slozhilos-neodnoznachnoe-
vospriyatie-dannoj-idei
64	 This	kind	of	approach	was	directly	manifested	by	the	Presidential	Adminis-
tration,	when	it	opened	a	Facebook	profile	in	the	Kazakh	language	in	addition	
to	its	profile	in	the	Russian	language,	and	declared	openly	that	the	contents	
published	on	these	two	profiles	would	be	different.	
65	 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Md20xat38AM
66	 http://www.socreklama.kz/kazaxskaya-socialnaya-reklama/
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state	has	been	the	president’s	proposal	to	rename	the	state	Kazak 
Eli	(literally	‘The	State	of	Kazakhs’).	In	turn,	the	requirement	to	
pass	a	Kazakh	language	examination	when	applying	for	the	elite	
Bolashak	 scholarship	 proves	 that	 the	 intention	 exists	 to	 build	
state	institutions	based	on	ethnic	Kazakhs	and	people	who	fully	
identify	themselves	with	the	state.	The	same	language	examina-
tion	requirement	applies	to	candidates	for	president	and	prospec-
tive	public	administration	workers67.	
In	the	official	narrative,	Kazakhstan	does	not	mention	the	civili-
sational	progress	it	made	due	to	being	part	of	the	Soviet	Union68	
(and	to	the	influx	of	a	Russian-speaking	population	to	its	cities),	
but	does,	to	a	limited	extent,	discuss	its	costs	(i.e.	the	famine	in	the	
1920s,	the	repressions	in	the	1930s	and	the	extermination	of	the	
Kazakh	elite	are	mentioned,	though	associating	this	in	an	obvious	
manner	with	the	Soviet	Union	is	avoided)	and	openly	emphasises	
the	ecological	tragedy	of	Semipalatinsk69	(this	is	also	an	offshoot	
of	Nazarbayev’s	initiatives	for	nuclear	disarmament).	The	policy	
of	building	a	modern	nation	is	open,	which	means	that	represent-
atives	of	ethnic	minorities	who	make	the	effort	to	assimilate	by	
learning	Kazakh	experience	hardly	any	discrimination	and	are	
accepted	by	the	Kazakh	public.	
The	 historical	 memory	 policy	 which	 has	 been	 activated	 over	
the	 past	 few	years	 also	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 building	 the	
bond	 between	 the	Kazakh	 public	 and	 their	 state.	 It	 is	 intended	
to	 emphasise	 its	 distinctness	 through	 the	 search	 for	 old	 roots	
and	 propagating	 knowledge	 of	Kazakhstan	 (the	 publications	 on	
67	 This	system	is	not	always	strictly	observed,	partly	due	to	the	omnipresent	
nepotism	in	the	state	administration.	
68	 Kazakhstan’s	policy	is	also	viewed	this	way	by	Russian	nationalists,	for	ex-
ample,	http://sputnikipogrom.com/politics/47886/russian-land-of-kazakh-
stan-3/#.Vmqx8rPSmDZ
69	 Hundreds	of	nuclear	explosions	were	carried	out	at	the	nuclear	test	site	near	
Semipalatinsk	(Semey),	and	the	consequences	of	the	contamination	is	still	
felt	in	Kazakhstan.	
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Kazakhstan’s	 statehood	 tradition	 are	 one	manifestation	 of	 this)	
and	highlighting	Kazakhs’	historical	achievements,	for	example,	
by	building	mausoleums	of	Kazakh	heroes	(this	concerns	heroes	
from	the	Kazakh	khanate	era	as	well	as	World	War	II	heroes)	and	
in	fact	promoting	the	cult	of	progenitors	of	Kazakh	nationalism	
and	Alash	Orda70	 (cf.	 the	 exhibition	at	 the	National	Museum	 in	
Kazakhstan).	This	is	accompanied	by	the	removal	of	monuments	
commemorating	the	Soviet	past	(statutes	of	Lenin	have	been	re-
moved	in	most	of	the	cities	in	Kazakhstan).	The	celebrations	of	the	
550th	anniversary	of	Kazakh	statehood	 in	2015	announced	 in	re-
sponse	to	Putin’s	words	at	the	Seliger	forum	in	2014	that	“Kazakhs	
did	not	have	a	state	of	their	own	before	Nazarbayev”	(mentioned	
above)	were	also	aimed	at	promoting	the	state.	
The	pro-state	 (patriotic)	attitude	 is	also	propagated	on	 the	 level	
of	business,	 for	example,	by	means	of	the	 ‘Made	in	Kazakhstan’	
campaign	announced	in	spring	2015	encouraging	the	purchase	of	
Kazakh	products	since	the	market	had	been	flooded	with	Russian	
goods	(in	effect	of	the	sudden	devaluation	of	the	Russian	curren-
cy,	while	the	Kazakh	currency	was	still	strong)	or	the	most	recent	
ideas	of	 creating	Kazakhstan’s	own	 trademark	 ‘The	State	of	 the	
Great	Steppe’.	
The	changes	in	the	symbolic	policy,	for	example,	the	fact	that	Ka-
zakhstan	since	2013	celebrates	the	Defender	of	the	Fatherland	Day	
on	7	May	(and	not	on	23	February,	as	in	Russia)	to	dilute	the	signif-
icance	of	Russia’s	most	important	holiday,	the	Victory	Day	(cele-
brated	on	9	May).	In	2015,	Kazakhstan	also	officially	introduced,	in	
addition	to	the	Russian	black-and-orange	ribbon	of	Saint	George,	
70	 Alash	Orda	was	a	pro-independence	group;	in	1917	it	led	to	the	setting	up	of	
an	autonomous	Kazakh	state	in	an	area	which	had	been	part	of	the	Russian	
Empire.	The	autonomy	was	liquidated	by	Bolsheviks	in	1920,	and	members	of	
Alash	Orda	suffered	repressions.	They	are	greatly	respected	in	Kazakhstan.	
There	is	a	painting	presenting	Kazakhstan’s	20th	century	history	at	the	Na-
tional	Museum	in	Astana.	The	leaders	of	Alash	Orda	are	the	central	element	
of	this	painting,	and	their	executions	by	Communists	are	presented	as	one	
of	the	secondary	motifs.	
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a	symbol	of	its	own,	a	blue-and-yellow	ribbon	which	is	worn	on	
the	occasion	of	the	7	and	9	May	celebrations71.	The	National	Sym-
bols	Act,	which	was	amended	in	December	2015,	requires	that	Ka-
zakhstan’s	flag	must	always	be	placed	next	to	a	foreign	country’s	
flag	whenever	one	is	displayed	and	introduces	a	new	holiday	cel-
ebrating	the	national	symbols	on	4	June.	The	act	is	another	step	
towards	building	pro-state	sentiments	and	reiterates	the	fact	that	
Kazakhstan	is	a	sovereign	country	which	has	its	own	symbols	and	
does	not	need	to	use	the	symbols	of	other	states	(implicitly,	Rus-
sia)	when	celebrating	public	holidays.	The	policy	of	building	 its	
own	tradition	and	customs	also	concerns	such	subtle	elements	as,	
for	example,	giving	up	the	manner	of	marching	used	in	the	Rus-
sian	army72.	
The	government’s	migration	policy	is	also	intended	to	contribute	
to	public	consolidation	and	a	kind	of	Kazakhisation	of	the	coun-
try.	This	boils	down	 to	encouraging	ethnic	Kazakhs	 to	 settle	 in	
the	northern	part	of	the	country,	for	example	as	part	of	the	Ser-
pen	programme,	a	scholarship	offer	addressed	to	 the	overpopu-
lated	 southern	 part	 of	 the	 country,	where	 ethnic	 Kazakhs	 pre-
dominate,	allowing	them	to	study	free	of	charge	at	universities	in	
northern	Kazakhstan,	or	through	creating	incentives	for	the	oral-
man to	settle	in	these	regions.	Astana	also	does	nothing	to	impede	
the	implementation	of	Russia’s	repatriation	policy	targeted	at	eth-
nic	Russians	living	in	Kazakhstan	(more	than	90%	of	emigrants	
from	Kazakhstan	in	2014	left	for	Russia	or	Belarus73;	ethnic	Rus-
sians	also	have	an	exceptionally	high	desire	to	emigrate	–	in	2013,	
60%	of	ethnic	Russians	declared	they	would	be	willing	to	leave	the	
71	 The	Russian	orange-and-black	Saint	George	ribbon	was	removed	from	a	shop-
ping	centre	in	Shimkent	in	2015	following	an	intervention	from	‘national	pa-
triot’	circles.	In	After	Turkey	shot	down	a	Russian	aircraft	on	24	November	
2015,	a	school	in	northern	Kazakhstan	cancelled	a	celebration	devoted	to	the	
memory	of	one	of	the	Russian	pilots	who	had	died	(he	had	been	a	pupil	of	this	
school).	
72	 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/77201
73	 http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/26-tyisyach-reshili-uehat-kazah-
stana-2014-godu-269167/
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country	if,	in	their	opinion,	the	situation	deteriorated,	for	exam-
ple,	due	to	intensifying	Kazakh	nationalism	and	a	change	in	gov-
ernment74).	 The	 government	 has	 not	 hindered	 Russia’s	 scholar-
ship	policy	in	Kazakhstan,	but	this	is	happening	at	a	cost,	leading,	
for	 example,	 to	 the	 so-called	 ‘brain	drain’,	which	 also	 concerns	
ethnic	Kazakhs.	
The	measures	 taken	 to	 limit	Russia’s	 influence	 in	 the	media	 in-
clude	(so	far	unsuccessful)	attempts	to	reduce	the	presence	of	the	
Russian	media	in	Kazakhstan,	one	of	the	examples	being	the	Ad-
vertisement	Act	 adopted	 in	201575.	Astana	has	also	made	efforts	
to	balance	Russia’s	civilisational	appeal	by	fostering	the	develop-
ment	of	KazNet	and	also	by	propagating	trilingual	school	educa-
tion	and	the	knowledge	of	English76.	
Finally,	in	2015	the	government	decided	to	take	decisive	measures	
against	any	signs	of	separatism	in	Kazakhstan,	sentencing	at	least	
three	citizens	 for	such	activity	 (including	one	ethnic	Kazakh)77.	
Stricter	penalties	have	been	set	 for	 taking	part	 in	military	con-
flicts	outside	the	country,	and	at	 least	one	person	received	a	 jail	
sentence	for	fighting	in	Ukraine.	These	actions	were	aimed	above	
all	at	Moscow,	and	they	were	intended	at	demonstrating	that	Ka-
zakhstan,	 unlike	 Ukraine	 governed	 by	 Yanukovych,	 is	 an	 effi-
ciently	operating	state.	
74	 http://gazeta.caravan.kz/articles/kto-uezzhaet-iz-kazakhstana-arti-
cleID94710.html
75	 http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/zapret-reklamyi-inostrannyih-
kanalah-pozvolit-kazahstanskomu-285941/
http://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2015/12/17/n_8021957.shtml
76	 There	are	plans	to	introduce	education	in	English	to	all	second-degree	schools	
in	2023/2024	https://primeminister.kz/news/show/22/perehod-na-trehja-
zychnoe-obrazovanie-v-shkolah-rk-planiruetsja-nachat-s-2023-goda-/25-
11-2015?lang=en.	This	policy	is	strongly	criticised	by	the	teachers’	commu-
nity,	who	argue	that	the	system	is	not	ready	for	such	revolutionary	changes.	
National	patriots	are	also	among	the	critics	due	to	their	belief	that	this	will	
lead	to	the	fall	of	Kazakh	language.	
77	 http://www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan-pro-russian-activist-jai	led/	27421352.html
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Were	 Moscow	 to	 make	 a	 decisive	 objection	 and,	 for	 example,	
stress	the	rights	of	ethnic	Russians	living	in	Kazakhstan	then	this	
could	put	the	continuation	of	this	trend	in	domestic	policy	at	stake	
and,	 in	a	more	extreme	scenario,	 could	destabilise	Kazakhstan.	
The	 trends	 described	 above	 are	 not	 new	 –	 the	 government	 has	
been	implementing	them	with	various	degrees	of	intensity	over	
the	past	quarter-century.	However,	they	have	been	gaining	mo-
mentum	recently,	and	their	political	aspect	as	an	instrument	for	
strengthening	the	state	in	the	face	of	Russian	pressure	has	been	
increasingly	visible.	
3. The economic liberalisation
The	economic	problems	caused	by	falling	oil	prices	have	gone	far	
beyond	the	worst-case	scenarios	drawn	up	by	the	government	al-
ready	in	spring	2015	and	have	forced	a	deep	revision	of	 the	eco-
nomic	policy	then	in	place.	The	economic	reforms	(their	scale	and	
tempo	of	 implementation)	are	above	all	a	response	to	the	crisis,	
but	they	still	fit	 in	with	the	structural	guidelines	for	the	recon-
struction	of	the	state.	The	present	economic	crisis	is	the	most	seri-
ous	since	the	1990s	and	is	generating	powerful	stimuli	and	forcing	
the	government	to	carry	out	thorough	economic	reforms78.
The	most	important	element	of	the	changes	in	the	economy	was	
adopting	a	flexible	exchange	rate	policy	a	few	years	earlier	than	
originally	planned.	As	a	consequence	of	this,	the	tenge	lost	around	
50	percent	of	its	value	against	the	US	dollar	throughout	2015.	The	
devaluation	of	 the	 tenge	worsened	the	financial	situation	of	 the	
Kazakh	public	and	led	to	a	withdrawal	from	the	previous	policy	
of	minimising	the	social	costs	of	the	reforms	(especially,	after	the	
Zhanaozen	massacre).	 This	 policy	 had	 been	 adopted	 due	 to	 the	
fear	of	breaking	the	informal	social	contract,	losing	support,	and	
78	 This	has	been	directly	pointed	out	by	the	World	Bank:	http://www-wds.world-
bank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/05/04/090224
b082e34ac4/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Kazakhstan000L0pportunity0to0reform.pdf
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protests.	 The	 devaluation	 was	 accompanied	 by	 the	 discontinu-
ation	 of	 the	 success	 policy	 and	 admitting	 that	 the	 country	 had	
found	itself	on	the	brink	of	crisis.	As	regards	politics,	the	devalu-
ation	was	also	forced	by	Russian	policy:	Russia,	referring	to	the	
Eurasian	Economic	Union,	refused	to	limit	its	exports	to	Kazakh-
stan,	even	 though	Astana	asked	 it	 to	do	so	because	 this	created	
a	high	risk	of	bankruptcy	for	local	manufacturers.	
The	announcement	of	enhanced	privatisation	of	state-owned	as-
sets	in	December	2015	was	another	important	element	of	changes	
in	the	economy.	This	covers	assets	owned	by	the	state-controlled	
holdings:	Samruk-Kazyna,	Baitarek	and	KazAgro.	The	assets	to	be	
sold	include	the	largest	refineries,	energy	firms	(KazMunayGas),	
airports,	 railways	 and	 a	whole	 array	 of	 smaller	 companies,	 in-
cluding	 local	media.	 Its	goal	 is	 to	reduce	the	state’s	share	 in	 the	
economy	and	 to	boost	 competition.	The	privatisation	 is	 also	 ex-
pected	to	help	build	an	 international	financial	centre	 in	Astana	
modelled	on	Dubai:	 its	working	 language	will	 be	English	 and	 it	
will	operate	according	to	British	law.	
Solutions	liberalising	some	sectors	which	regulate	the	function-
ing	of	 the	economy	have	also	been	adopted.	One	example	 is	 the	
labour	law	offering	employers	more	flexible	terms	of	hiring	and	
dismissing	employees.	Some	subsidies	which	survived	 from	So-
viet	 times	have	also	been	withdrawn,	such	as	bread	production	
subsidies,	energy	price	allowances,	etc.	
These	 moves	 have	 been	 coupled	 with	 a	 new	 series	 of	 reforms	
aimed	at	improving	the	investment	climate,	for	example,	imple-
menting	the	one-desk	principle,	establishing	the	institution	of	an	
investments	ombudsman	and	a	specialist	economic	court	as	part	
of	the	Supreme	Court.	They	thus	fit	in	with	the	broader	changes	
taking	place	in	the	state.	Furthermore,	in	February	2016	attract-
ing	 foreign	 investment	 in	 areas	 of	 the	 economy	 other	 than	 the	
primary	sector	was	recognised	as	 the	main	goal	of	operation	of	
Kazakh	diplomatic	missions.	
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At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 government	has	 decided	 to	 apply	 the	 old	
mechanisms	 for	 dealing	 with	 the	 crisis	 which	 were	 tested	 in	
2008-2009,	i.e.	a	financial	injection	worth	around	US$5	billion	to	
be	financed	mainly	using	the	assets	of	the	pension	fund	(this	has	
been	widely	criticised	by	the	public)	and	foreign	loans.	The	funds	
will	be	used,	for	example,	to	stimulate	lending,	which	has	practi-
cally	has	been	frozen	since	the	devaluation	of	the	tenge	(in	part	
due	to	deposit	dollarisation).	
What	will	in	turn	contribute	to	implementing	the	reforms	is	the	
crisis	 on	 the	 raw	materials	market	 because	 it	will	make	 invest-
ments	in	other	sectors	more	appealing	than	those	in	the	primary	
sector.	It	needs	to	be	added	that	Kazakhstan’s	goal	is	not	to	over-
come	its	dependency	on	oil	exports,	but	rather	to	balance	the	im-
pact	of	the	oil	sector	through	the	development	and	modernisation	
of	the	economy.	The	measures	taken	to	help	achieve	this	goal	will	
include	changes	in	the	education	system,	for	example,	introducing	
free	of	charge	education	at	technical	faculties	beginning	from	2017.	
Kazakhstan’s	accession	to	the	WTO	(December	2015)	will	also	have	
a	 positive	 impact	 on	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 reforms.	 WTO	
membership	will	boost	competition	and	will	decrease	the	import	
tariffs	on	a	number	of	products	to	a	level	that	applied	before	the	
country	 joined	 the	Eurasian	Economic	Union.	This	 in	 turn	may	
lead	to	a	price	reduction.	The	accession	will	also	cause	a	liberalisa-
tion	of	the	services	market,	and	the	financial	and	telecommunica-
tion	sectors,	and	will	make	the	labour	market	more	flexible.	At	the	
same	time,	WTO	membership	will	have	an	adverse	effect	on	local	
firms,	which	will	be	forced	to	compete	harder,	especially	consid-
ering	that	 the	requirement	currently	 imposed	on	foreign	inves-
tors	to	buy	a	certain	part	of	goods	and	services	of	Kazakh	origin	is	
gradually	lifted.	On	the	other	hand,	Kazakhstan	will	benefit	from	
the	opportunity	to	use	the	WTO	dispute	settling	mechanism.	
It	is	still	unclear	what	final	impact	the	reforms	will	have	on	the	
economy.	 This	 is	 partly	 due	 to	 the	 government’s	 policy:	 even	
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though	economic	relations	have	been	liberalised,	the	government	
has	still	applied	measures	aimed	at	ameliorating	the	social	con-
sequences	 of	 the	 reforms,	 for	 example,	 temporary	discounts	 on	
railway	services	and	electricity	for	the	private	sector,	three-year	
memoranda	 guaranteeing	 the	 purchase	 of	 products	 from	 state-
owned	plants	or	price	controls	on	socially	sensitive	goods	out	of	
fear	 of	 people’s	 reaction	 to	 the	 deterioration	 of	 their	 financial	
situation79	 (in	2016-2017).	 If	 these	are	temporary	measures,	 they	
will	relieve	the	social	consequences	of	a	sudden	liberalisation	and	
opening	up	of	the	economy	(since	the	accession	to	the	WTO,	see	
below)	and	will	provide	tangible	support	to	firms	in	Kazakhstan.	
However,	if	such	measures	are	used	in	the	long	term,	they	will	be	
proof	of	the	government’s	inability	to	continue	reforms.	Further-
more,	the	government’s	moves,	such	as	the	announced	privatisa-
tion,	 are	medium-term	and	will	 be	 implemented	 in	 the	 coming	
two	years,	 and	 their	 effects	 (or	 the	 lack	 thereof)	will	 be	visible	
only	in	the	long	term.	Business	and	political	groups	will	most	like-
ly	oppose	the	implementation	of	the	reforms	at	full	swing	due	to	
a	desire	to	maintain	their	economic	and	political	 influence,	and	
the	public	would	reject	them	due	to	an	unwillingness	to	incur	the	
costs	of	the	changes	and	because	they	would	view	them	part	of	the	
reforms	as	socially	unjust80.	
4. Institutionalisation of co-operation with the West as 
a response to Russian and Chinese pressure
Institutionalisation	of	co-operation	with	the	West	is	Kazakhstan’s	
response	to	the	challenges	on	the	international	arena	and	the	in-
creasing	pressure	from	Russia	and	also	China.	From	Kazakhstan’s	
79	 On	the	other	hand,	it	can	be	seen	that	the	Soviet	system	of	subsidising	so-
cially	sensitive	services	is	being	relinquished,	examples	of	which	include:	
lifting	the	widely	used	bread	production	subsidies	(since	2016)	and	discon-
tinuing	the	regulation	of	prices	on	the	municipal	services	market	(starting	
from	2017).	This	shows	the	government’s	inconsistency	in	carrying	out	the	
guidelines	of	the	reforms	out	of	fear	of	reactions	from	the	Kazakh	public.	
80	 A	foretaste	of	this	tendency	was	the	trade	unions’	resistance	to	amending	
the	labour	code	expressed	in	an	open	letter	(summer	2015).	
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point	of	view,	it	is	essential	to	maintain	its	present	multidimen-
sional	foreign	policy	under	growing	pressure	from	Russia	(with	
whom	Kazakhstan	has	the	strongest	and	closest	possible	bonds),	
above	all	in	the	area	of	security.	Therefore,	Astana’s	goal	is,	on	the	
one	hand,	 to	avoid	conflict	with	Russia	as	regards	global	 issues,	
which	are	 essential	 for	Moscow’s	 reputation81,	 and	on	 the	other	
hand	to	robustly	protect	its	political	interests,	which	are	however	
called	‘economic’	(at	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union’s	forum)	and	to	
continue	its	narrative	of	the	strategic	nature	of	mutual	relations82.	
While	Astana	wants	 to	 dilute	 Russia’s	 influence	 in	 its	 domestic	
policy	by	placing	emphasis	on	Kazakhstan’s	history,	symbols	and	
the	nation-building	role	of	the	state,	it	attempts	to	maintain	au-
tonomy	in	foreign	policy	in	relations	with	other	countries,	even	
those	which	 Russia	 is	 at	 conflict	with.	 This	makes	 Kazakhstan	
fear	the	need	to	take	Russia’s	side	in	the	constantly	arising	disput-
able	issues,	such	as	Russia’s	annexation	of	Crimea	or	the	Russian-
Turkish	conflict	caused	by	Turkish	 forces	shooting	down	a	Rus-
sian	bomber	aircraft.	
Kazakhstan’s	 traditional	 way	 to	 balance	 Russia’s	 influence	 has	
been	to	open	up	to	the	other	large	player	present	in	the	region—
China.	 Economic	 co-operation	 with	 China,	 Russia’s	 important	
81	 Cf.	the	unclear,	albeit	received	as	pro-Russian,	stance	adopted	by	Kazakh-
stan’s	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	on	the	referendum	in	Crimea	or	after	Tur-
key	shot	down	the	Russian	bomber	aircraft	and	Nazarbayev’s	comments	on	
this	in	his	address	to	the	nation	on	30	November	2015	(only	in	the	TV	version,	
the	printed	version	of	the	address	does	not	contain	these	comments).	
82	 However,	Nazarbayev	has	also	resorted	to	statements	that	Kazakhstan	might	
leave	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union	if	this	organisation	puts	its	sovereignty	
at	risk.	He	usually	does	so	in	his	speeches	for	domestic	use,	addressed	to	the	
Kazakh	part	of	society	(cf.	the	comments	on	his	dual-track	narrative).	For	
example,	in	August	2014	such	words	were	used	in	an	interview	for	Khabar	
television	in	the	Kazakh	language	which	lasted	around	one	hour.	They	were	
widely	publicised	by	the	Ukrainian	and	Russian	media,	which	presented	
them	as	a	response	to	Putin’s	widely	known	statement	questioning	Kazakh-
stan’s	statehood	during	the	Seliger	forum.	However,	in	reality,	the	interview	
was	published	several	days	earlier	and	did	not	meet	with	massive	attention	
from	the	foreign	media.	
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economic	 partner,	 is	 intended	 to	mitigate	Moscow’s	 aspirations	
in	 Central	 Asia	 but	 also	 to	 boost	 the	 country’s	 economic	 devel-
opment.	In	effect	of	these	assumptions,	Kazakhstan	participates	
both	in	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union	and	in	China’s	project,	the	
New	Silk	Road	Economic	Belt	–	the	two	are	competitive	projects	
which	Russia	and	China	intend	to	use	in	order	to	build	their	own	
influence	in	the	region.	
At	first,	participation	in	these	projects	was	viewed	as	a	way	to	bal-
ance	the	influence	of	Russia	and	China.	Now,	though,	it	appears	
that	the	intensification	and	institutionalisation	of	relations	(with	
Russia	as	part	of	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union)	and	the	sense	of	
threat	from	Moscow	have	convinced	Kazakhstan	to	accelerate	the	
institutionalisation	and	enhancement	of	co-operation	with	other	
actors.	Signs	of	this	policy	include	the	accession	to	the	WTO	(De-
cember	2015)	or	signing	the	enhanced	Partnership	and	Co-opera-
tion	Agreement	(enhanced	PCA)	with	the	EU	(21	December	2015).	
These	agreements	formalise	co-operation	with	the	West	and	are	
intended	to	help	Astana	avoid	its	foreign	policy	being	limited	to	
co-operation	with	Russia	and	China	(as	is	the	case	with	its	neigh-
bour,	Mongolia).	Strategically,	they	are	aimed	at	maintaining	the	
opportunity	to	modernise	the	state	in	co-operation	with	the	West	
in	 the	 broader	 meaning	 of	 the	 term.	 Signing	 the	 co-operation	
agreement	with	the	OECD	in	January	2015	and	the	ambitious	goal	
to	 join	 the	 world’s	 30	 best-developed	 nations	 were	 intended	 to	
serve	the	same	goal83.	
Given	 the	 principle	 of	 avoiding	 provoking	Russia,	 Kazakhstan’s	
foreign	 policy	 is	 focused	 on	 keeping	 losses	 to	 a	 minimum	 and	
83	 The	effects	of	co-operation	with	the	OECD	include	the	organisation	conduct-
ing	a	kind	of	audit	of	Kazakhstan	(Multi-dimensional	Review	of	Kazakhstan)	
and	developing	comprehensive	recommendations	concerning	the	country’s	
development.	The	first	in	the	series	of	three	OECD	reports	on	this	was	pub-
lished	in	January	2016.	It	is	available	here:	http://www.oecd.org/dev/multi-
dimensional-review-of-kazakhstan-9789264246768-en.htm
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maintaining	 its	 autonomous	 position	 where	 possible.	 For	 this	
reason	its	adjustment	is	barely	visible	at	first	sight	–	Kazakhstan	
itself	 has	 defined	 Russia	 as	 its	 strategic	 partner	 since	 the	 very	
beginning	 of	 its	 independence.	However,	 since	 the	 internation-
al	 context	 around	Kazakhstan	has	 changed,	 the	 government	 in	
Astana	has	to	cope	with	the	challenge	of	continuing	its	previous	
multidimensional	 foreign	 policy.	 Given	 the	 present	 geopolitical	
conditions,	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	 its	 links	with	 the	West	 is	
both	dangerous	and	necessary.	While	the	West	is	at	conflict	with	
Russia	over	Ukraine,	Kazakhstan’s	links	with	the	West	will	slow	
down	the	process	of	it	entering	further	into	Russia’s	shadow	at	the	
expense	of	its	own	sovereignty.	
The	continuation	of	this	strategy	may	be	impeded	by	increasing	
pressure	from	Russia,	especially	during	the	process	of	the	succes-
sion	to	Nazarbayev.	His	potential	successor	will	take	over	the	pre-
sent	presidential	prerogatives	and	will	have	 to	be	 supported	by	
Moscow	–	if	only	to	avoid	the	risk	of	the	destabilisation	of	the	situ-
ation	inside	Kazakhstan	by	Russia.	From	Moscow’s	point	of	view,	
the	most	convenient	scenario	would	be	to	maintain	the	existing	
political	 system	 in	 Kazakhstan,	 where	 Nazarbayev’s	 successor	
will	be	objectively	weaker	than	the	present	president,	lacking	his	
esteem,	and	would	be	forced	to	rely	on	Moscow	to	maintain	a	con-
solidated	state	and	to	avoid	internal	chaos	(for	example,	ethnic	ri-
ots).	This	means	that	Russia	could	take	advantage	of	Nazarbayev’s	
departure	to	regain	its	custody	of	Kazakhstan.	
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iii. conclusions and possible developMents
Kazakhstan	 is	an	exceptional	 case	among	 the	post-Soviet	 coun-
tries.	 Although	 it	 is	 an	 authoritarian	 state,	 it	 has	 been	 able	 to	
diagnose	 a	 systemic	 crisis	 and	 reach	 out	 to	 modern	 and	 risky	
methods	 for	 overcoming	 it.	 This	 approach	 makes	 Kazakhstan	
and	Nazarbayev	himself	distinct	from	the	other	countries	in	the	
region	and	their	 leaders.	At	present,	Kazakhstan	is	one	of	those	
few	post-Soviet	countries	which	are	making	consistent	efforts	to	
modernise	the	state,	and	which	view	modernisation	as	the	solu-
tion	 to	 its	 problems,	 rather	 than	 tightening	 the	 authoritarian	
grip.	Paradoxically,	the	changes	have	been	introduced	by	way	of	
soft	authoritarian	methods,	while	their	possible	implementation	
may	in	the	 longer	 term	lead	to	 the	political	system	currently	 in	
place	being	dismantled.	
The	scale	of	the	announced	and	already	partly	implemented	ad-
justments	to	Kazakhstan’s	policy	means	that	it	is	possible	to	risk	
the	statement	that	the	country	is	on	its	way	to	a	thorough	recon-
struction	 of	 the	 elements	which	 are	 of	 key	 significance	 for	 the	
functioning	 of	 the	 state.	 These	 changes	 have	 been	 designed	 by	
Nazarbayev,	and	–	given	their	ambitious	goals	–	they	are	reminis-
cent	of	perestroika initiated	by	Gorbachev	in	the	USSR.	They	also	
carry	a	similar	risk.	Kazakhstan	 is	able	to	search	for	and	reach	
out	 to	new	models	 of	development	which	do	not	 carry	 the	bur-
den	of	 the	Soviet	 legacy,	 in	 the	Western	or	Eastern	Asian	 style.	
It	is	symbolic	that	this	perestroika is	being	implemented	by	Naz-
arbayev,	who	has	ruled	Kazakhstan	from	the	Soviet	era	and	who	
was	expected	to	take	over	the	Soviet	leadership	from	Gorbachev.	
Nazarbayev	knows	the	costs	of	the	perestroika initiated	at	the	twi-
light	of	 the	Soviet	Union	better	 than	anyone	else.	By	 launching	
a	similar	project	in	Kazakhstan,	he	is	betting	everything	on	one	
card,	probably	because	he	 is	convinced	 that	 the	state	 in	 its	pre-
sent	shape	is	too	weak	to	withstand	Russian	imperialism	and	the	
creeping	Chinese	 expansion.	 From	Nazarbayev’s	 viewpoint,	 the	
present	model	of	the	state	is	inadequate	to	guarantee	its	further	
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development	and	make	Kazakhstan	resistant	to	geopolitical	and	
domestic	turbulence.	
The	future	of	the	state	modernisation	project	will	be	affected	by	
internal	and	external	limitations.	The	main	obstacle	will	be	reluc-
tance	from	the	political	and	business	elite	who	are	interested	in	
maintaining	their	own	position	in	the	government	and	economic	
system.	Another	factor	is	how	long	Nazarbayev	will	remain	in	of-
fice.	His	presence	in	the	system	helps	the	implementation	of	the	
changes	and	reduces	the	risk	of	domestic	tension	and	public	pro-
tests.	On	the	other	hand,	the	authoritarian	system	based	on	him	
will	limit	the	effects	of	the	changes	or	will	be	adjusted	itself	as	a	re-
sult	of	the	changes.	Nazarbayev’s	departure	will	certainly	bring	
a	shock	to	Kazakhstan,	but	it	will	also	be	a	test	to	the	government	
elite:	to	what	extent	will	it	be	able	to	continue	the	present	line	of	
the	country’s	development	and	its	foreign	policy?	Finally,	reforms	
will	be	obstructed	by	the	limited	ability	of	the	public	to	take	part	
in	 the	 modernisation	 processes	 while	 their	 financial	 condition	
worsens,	as	well	as	by	the	divides	existing	in	society.	
As	regards	 the	 international	context,	Russia’s	policy	will	be	 the	
most	 important	 factor	 for	 Kazakhstan’s	 further	 development.	
Over	 the	 past	 few	 years	 this	 has	 become	 increasingly	 aggres-
sive	 and	 unpredictable.	 The	way	 the	Kremlin	 sets	 its	 priorities	
as	part	of	 its	reconquista	 of	 ‘Russian	 land’	will	decide	on	 the	 fu-
ture	of	Kazakhstan.	The	risk	of	intervention	from	Russia	(at	the	
political	level	or	through	provocations	inside	Kazakhstan)	is	in-
creasing	 during	 the	 succession	 process.	 It	 cannot	 be	 ruled	 out	
that	Nazarbayev’s	double	game	is	viewed	by	Moscow	(and	Putin	
himself)	as	an	obstacle	to	drawing	Kazakhstan	closer	to	Russia.	
This	means	 that	his	departure	 from	 the	 system	will	be	used	as	
an	opportunity	to	bring	Astana	closer	to	Moscow.	Especially	since	
Kazakhstan’s	potential	success	would	be	dangerous	for	Russia	–	it	
would	show	that	a	country	can	be	reformed	and	does	not	have	to	
be	clearly	pro-Western	(and	anti-Russian),	unlike	Georgia	under	
Mikheil	Saakashvili’s	rule.	
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Perestroika	 in	Kazakhstan	 is	 a	 risky	 solution.	 If	 some	of	 the	an-
nounced	 changes	 are	 introduced,	 the	 existing	 mechanisms	 of	
the	 state’s	 operation	may	 collapse	 and	 cause	 internal	 chaos.	On	
the	 other	 hand,	 strengthening	 the	 authoritarian	 regime	would	
lead	to	Kazakhstan	being	more	and	more	strongly	overshadowed	
by	Russia’s	political	and	social	influence,	as	has	been	happening	
over	 the	 past	 few	years	 in	Azerbaijan.	 The	 authoritarianism	 in	
Nazarbayev’s	‘khan-like’	version	also	poses	the	risk	of	shock	and	
destabilisation	of	the	state	after	he	relinquishes	power.	
If	the	reform	process	is	derailed	(including	due	to	moves	made	by	
Russia)	and	a	multidimensional	crisis	comes,	the	internal	chaos	
will	bring	about	the	risk	of	degeneration	of	the	political	and	re-
gional	elites	and	a	disintegration	of	the	state	institutions	and,	as	
a	 consequence,	Kazakhstan’s	would	be	 sucked	 into	Russia.	This	
will	help	Russia	regain	its	influence	across	Central	Asia.	This	sce-
nario	carries	an	increased	risk	of	socio-political	turbulence,	espe-
cially	during	the	process	of	succession	to	Nazarbayev.	This	puts	at	
stake	the	functioning	of	the	state	because,	as	shown	by	Ukraine’s	
example,	there	is	a	great	number	of	scenarios	(and	great	poten-
tial	for	creating	them)	in	which	Russia	can	utilise	chaos	in	a	state	
to	rebuild	its	own	position.	Nevertheless,	the	increasingly	strong	
nationalist	 tendencies	 and	 the	myth	 of	 Kazakhstan	 created	 by	
Nazarbayev	will	impede	the	process	of	digesting	Kazakhstan	and	
the	reconquista of	Central	Asia.	
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